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1 Introduction
Behind all things are reasons. Reasons can even explain the absurd. Do
we have the time to learn the reasons behind the human being’s varied
behavior? I think not. Some take the time.
– Log Lady, Twin Peaks
There is a large body of empirical evidence that people do not always behave accord-
ing to game theoretic predictions in many economic or social environments. Possible
deviations from standard-economic behavior can occur when individuals have either
(i) non-standard beliefs, which are systematically biased, (ii) non-standard prefer-
ences, such as preferences for fairness, or (iii) when they engage in imperfect utility
maximization, for example, because of limited attention and only consider salient
alternatives in their choice sets (Rabin, 2002). This thesis addresses issues related to
such forms of boundedly rational behavior and non-standard utility maximization.
As a general term, for all deviations from standard-economic behavior mentioned
above, I will use the expression “non-standard decision-making” in this thesis.
The field of behavioral economics deals with questions concerning non-standard
decision-making, by combining elements from economics and psychology. This area
of economic research has become increasingly important in recent years, which was
also reflected in the Nobel Prize for Richard H. Thaler in 2017. Research in this
field has been able to explain many empirical findings and economic puzzles, such
as charitable giving (Ariely, Bracha, and Meier, 2009), blood donations (Mellstro¨m
and Johannesson, 2008), overbidding in auctions (Crawford and Iriberri, 2007), or
default effects in retirement savings (Madrian and Shea, 2001).
With my own work, I want to contribute to the vast experimental literature in
behavioral economics. For this purpose, I will look at three different environments in
which non-standard decision-making is commonly observed: common value auctions,
public good games, and elections. The main aims of my research in these areas
are the following: (i) finding the underlying channels of non-standard decision-
making; (ii) investigating how the occurrence of potential cognitive mistakes can be
reduced; (iii) checking whether mental shortcuts, or heuristics, are always irrational
or whether they can be sometimes beneficial for individuals or groups and even lead
to more socially efficient outcomes; (iv) furthermore, I am interested in the reasons
and the economic consequences of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior.
With this, I would like to answer questions that have not yet been conclusively
clarified in the literature so far. My empirical research strategy relies on laboratory
and online experiments. The thesis will consist of four main chapters (Sections 2,
3, 4, and 5) following after the introduction.
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The first chapter (Section 2) investigates the relationship between the winner’s
curse and mistakes in hypothetical thinking in the context of common value auc-
tions.1 There is evidence that bidders fall prey to the winner’s curse because they
fail to extract information from hypothetical events - like winning an auction. In
this chapter, I investigate experimentally whether bidders in a common value auc-
tion perform better when the requirements for this cognitive issue - also denoted by
contingent reasoning - are relaxed, leaving all other parameters unchanged. For my
underlying research question, I used a lab experiment with two stages. In stage I,
the subjects participate in a non-standard common value auction, called the wallet
game, in which a na¨ıve bidding strategy can lead to both winner’s curse and loser’s
curse. In stage II, the subjects in the treatment group learn whether their initial
bid was the winning bid or not and they get the opportunity to change this bid.
In this sense, the bidders face the same decision problems as in stage I again, but
the need for hypothetical thinking is reduced in stage II. More generally, I want to
answer the question whether models focusing on inconsistent beliefs of individuals,
like cursed equilibrium and level-k (Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Crawford and Iriberri,
2007) or approaches concerning contingent reasoning on hypothetical future events
(Charness and Levin, 2009; Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle, 2010; Esponda and Vespa,
2014) are more suitable for explaining the winner’s curse.
In summary, the main questions I want to answer in this chapter are:
1. Do subjects in a common value auction perform better when they already learn
ex ante, before the final payoffs are known, whether their bid is the winning
bid or not?
2. Are approaches concerning mistakes in contingent reasoning or belief-based
models like cursed equilibrium more accurate to explain the winner’s curse?
The second chapter (Section 3) deals with another cognitive mistakes known
as correlation neglect.2 This bias refers to underestimating the degree to which
various sources of information may be correlated. Typical examples for this issue
are the news media or markets for financial assets. In an online experiment, I
tested how the presence of correlation neglect affects the outcome in a collective
voting problem. My work aims to supplement the existing experimental literature on
correlation neglect by implementing a theoretical work of Levy and Razin (2015a).
The experimental setup I used, provides an environment that includes the main
features of their theoretical model: subjects with ideological preferences who receive
an imperfect signal about the state of the world - which might differ from their
1This chapter is based on Moser (2019).
Available under: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09693-9
2This chapter is based on Moser and Wallmeier (2019).
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preferences - and a collective decision via majority vote. So the participants in my
experiment are confronted with two conflicting objectives which they have to include
in their maximization problem. Since political preferences are difficult to measure
accurately, I focused on an approach where the choice of two alternatives depended
on the risk preferences of the participants. On the one hand this makes the whole
task more abstract, but on the other hand clear statements can be made about the
effect of correlation neglect, when subjects are affected by personal preferences. To
measure the effect of correlation neglect, the participants either received one signal,
two perfectly correlated signals, or two independent signals about a state of the
world in a between-subject design.
In summary, the main questions I want to answer in this chapter are:
1. Are subjects prone to correlation neglect in a collective decision problem -
even though the correlation of information is presented in an obvious way?
2. What is the effect of correlation neglect on the outcome of an election where
voters are influenced by ideological preferences?
The third chapter (Section 4) presents an experiment, where I tested whether
leadership can influence the contribution pattern of individuals in a public goods
game with growth.3 In this chapter, I combine existing experiments concerning
(i) leadership in static public goods games (see, for example, Moxnes and Van der
Heijden, 2003; Gu¨th, Levati, Sutter, and Van Der Heijden, 2007) and (ii) experiments
on dynamic public goods games with growth (see, for example, Ga¨chter, Mengel,
Tsakas, and Vostroknutov, 2017). In my setup, leadership is associated with role
model behavior or leading-by-example. This means that the leader has no formal
power, but simply acts as first-mover. Through the dynamic setting, where growth
is possible, I can investigate the long run effect of leadership. Additionally, I check
whether the behavioral type of the leader has an effect on the success of the group.
To determine the cooperation type of each individual, I used a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma where the participants had to make their decisions via strategy method.
In summary, the main questions I want to answer in this chapter are:
1. Does leading-by-example yield an improvement in a dynamic setting with en-
dowment carryover?
2. Does the behavioral type of the leader affect the group’s performance?
The fourth chapter (Section 5) thematically ties in with the third chapter.4
While, I show in the third chapter that cooperation types have a high predictive
3This chapter is based on Eichenseer and Moser (2019b).
4The fourth chapter is based on Eichenseer and Moser (2019a).
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power concerning the success of a group, I demonstrate in the fourth chapter that dif-
ferent methods for eliciting cooperation types are consistent to a large extent. More
preciously, I compare a one-shot public goods game with strategy method, using the
procedure of Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr (2001), with a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma, which was for example used in Miettinen, Kosfeld, Fehr, and Weibull
(2017) and Kosfeld (2019). Furthermore, I want to investigate which method yields
more valid results depending on the underlying research question.
In summary, the main questions I want to answer in this chapter are:
1. Are two structurally different methods for classifying cooperation types con-
sistent?
2. Which of these methods yields the more valid results?
This thesis concludes with a final review of the conducted experiments, where I
summarize the most important results and findings of my work (Section 6).
To answer the underlying questions, I made use of economic experiments, either
in the laboratory or as online experiments. Controlled lab and online experiments
have a few important advantages compared to field experiments or observational
data. For example, (i) subjects can be randomly assigned to different treatment
groups to rule out any selection biases and (ii) the researchers can keep specific
variables constant in the lab, which is not always possible in the field. This makes it
easier to make causal inferences. The lab experiments for the first and third chapter
were programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted in the Regensburg
Economic Science Lab (RESL). The online experiment for the second chapter was
programmed in LimeSurvey and conducted on the research platform Prolific. The
online experiment for the fourth chapter was programmed in LimeSurvey and con-
ducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). For the experiments, I received
a generous funding through the International Doctoral Program “Evidence-Based
Economics” of the Elite Network of Bavaria.
Overall, I hope that my thesis can contribute to the vast literature on non-
standard decision-making in behavioral economics by providing some new ideas and
motivations which hopefully might further help to identify potential cognitive mis-
takes and ultimately help to avoid irrational behavioral patterns.
4
2 Hypothetical thinking and the winner’s curse5
The winner’s curse is a well-known empirical phenomenon in common value auc-
tions, which was first described by Capen, Clapp, and Campbell (1971). They
showed that many oil companies in the 1960’s and 1970’s had to report a drop in
profit rates because of systematic overbidding in auctions for drilling rights. Later
experimental evidence for the winner’s curse was also found in a large number of lab
studies (see, for example, Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983; Thaler, 1988; Charness
and Levin, 2009; Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle, 2010).
I show in an experimental setup that bidders are more likely to avoid the win-
ner’s curse when they are informed, before submitting a bid, whether their bid is the
winning bid or not. By giving the subjects this information, I weaken the require-
ment for them to condition their bid on winning the auction: winning or losing are
now not hypothetical anymore, and the adverse selection issue of winning an auction
with a common value for all bidders becomes more salient. The findings of my thesis
suggest that mistakes in hypothetical thinking seem to explain a substantial part
of the winner’s curse. Thus, approaches that focus on this mental process might be
more suitable for explaining this phenomenon than belief-based models like cursed
equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005), which state that the winner’s curse is mainly
driven by inconsistent beliefs. Herewith, this thesis attempts to shed light on the
ongoing debate on whether models, focusing on the erroneous belief formation of
individuals, like cursed equilibrium and level-k (Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Crawford
and Iriberri, 2007)6 or approaches concerning contingent reasoning on hypothetical
future events (Charness and Levin, 2009; Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle, 2010; Esponda
and Vespa, 2014) are more suitable for explaining the winner’s curse.
Contingent reasoning refers to the ability of thinking through hypothetical sce-
narios and to perform state-by-state reasoning. There is evidence that people have
difficulties engaging in this cognitive task. While this is well documented in the
psychological literature (see, for example, Evans, 2007; Nickerson, 2015; Singmann,
Klauer, and Beller, 2016), economists devoted little attention to this issue for a long
time. However, in the more recent economic literature this topic appears more and
more frequently (see, for example, Charness and Levin, 2009; Louis, 2013; Esponda
and Vespa, 2014; Ngangoue´ and Weizsa¨cker, 2015; Levin, Peck, and Ivanov, 2016;
5This chapter is a slightly modified version of Moser (2019).
6Both models fall into the category of belief-based models, since the cause manifesting in the
winner’s curse is seen in the belief formation of individuals. The general assumptions of Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium are still fulfilled, in the sense that subjects best-respond to beliefs, but the as-
sumption about the consistency of beliefs is relaxed. In cursed equilibrium, the degree of cursedness
is given by χ ∈ [0, 1], i.e., the belief that with some probability χ the actions of the opponents
do not depend on their types. A value of 0 is equivalent to the usual Bayesian Nash Equilibrium,
whereas a value of 1 corresponds to a setting in which the players do not assume any correlation
between the actions of a player and his type, which is also denoted as fully cursed equilibrium.
5
Esponda and Vespa, 2016; Li, 2017; Koch and Penczynski, 2018).
In contrast to belief-based models, like cursed equilibrium, the concept of con-
tingent reasoning has still received very little formal treatment. Li (2017) represents
the first attempt to capture this mental process formally by introducing the concept
of obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms.7 A major contribution of Li’s paper
is to explain why subjects perform better in ascending bid auctions compared to
sealed bid auctions. However, it cannot explain why common value auctions might
be more challenging for the bidders than private value auctions. For this reason,
the concept of OSP mechanisms is not sufficient to fully capture the most relevant
aspects of the winner’s curse.
Can a broader definition of contingent reasoning explain why bidders fall prey
to the winner’s curse? To answer this question I will go back one step from OSP
mechanisms and focus only on the events of winning or losing an auction - which
provide information about the true value of a good in common but not in private
value auctions. Bidders in common value auctions now face two cognitive hurdles.
First, they have to be able to recognize and identify several hypothetical scenarios
which might possibly occur (e.g., winning or losing an auction) and second, the
bidders have to be able to infer information from such hypothetical events. The
question is which of these cognitive tasks is more challenging for subjects and to
what extent they affect the likelihood of the winner’s curse to occur. There are three
possibilities: (i) bidders are perfectly able to perform state-by-state reasoning, but
they neglect the informational content of the other bidders’ actions and, hence, the
informational content of winning an auction as proposed by cursed equilibrium; (ii)
bidders take into account that the bids of the other players are correlated with their
signals, but they are not able to identify the relevant states to condition on in the
first place; (iii) bidders are neither able to perform state-by-state reasoning, nor do
they take into account the informational content of winning an auction.
In this chapter, I test experimentally whether subjects in an auction are able to
infer information from the events of winning or losing if these are not hypothetical
anymore. For this purpose, I constructed a second-price auction in which the bidders
learn whether a bid, which was considered optimal ex ante, is the winning bid or not
(but without learning their payoff yet) and they receive the possibility to change this
bid. This treatment intervention is similar to the sequential treatment in Esponda
and Vespa (2014) where participants in an election learned whether their votes were
7According to Li (2017), a mechanism is OSP if and only if an optimal strategy can be found
without the necessity of performing contingent reasoning. However, Li’s definition of contingent
reasoning is very strict in a game-theoretic sense as it does not only involve conditioning on different
broader states of the world or future events (such as conditioning on being the winner in an auction
or conditioning on being the pivotal voter in an election), but also conditioning on each possible
decision node in a given information set. Additionally, there is only a differentiation between
whether a game is OSP or not, but no distinction between “more” or “less” contingent reasoning.
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pivotal or not before they had to cast a vote. In contrast to Koch and Penczynski
(2018) my approach is weaker, since it does not remove the need for contingent
reasoning at all, but only partly in a specific context. However, thereby I am able
to show whether such a weak manipulation, on a feedback basis, is sufficient for
subjects to improve their bids, without changing the whole structure of the game.
Additionally, it has to be noted that even Koch and Penczynski (2018) did not
meet the strict requirements of completely eliminating the necessity for contingent
reasoning, according to the definition of Li (2017). This further emphasizes the
urgent need for a consistent definition of this term.
The auction model I used in the experiment is based on a second-price sealed
bid auction similar to the wallet game proposed by Klemperer (1998) and the model
used in Avery and Kagel (1997), which is a non-standard common value auction.
The basic idea of the game is the following: two players, indexed by i = 1, 2, receive
a private iid signal, xi, drawn from some commonly known distribution. In a second-
price sealed bid auction they bid for an object worth v = x1 + x2. This game is
played in two stages. In stage I, the subjects participate in the wallet game against
a random opponent. In stage II, the subjects play the same auctions again, against
the decisions of the former opponent, but this time the subjects in the treatment
group are informed whether their initial bid was the winning bid or not. In this
sense, the bidders receive information about some realized event before they have
to come up with a bid.8 Apart from knowing whether their bid is the winning or
losing bid, the subjects face exactly the same decision problem as in stage I.
My design allows a clear distinction between mistakes in contingent reasoning
and cursed equilibrium since two crucial assumptions of the latter are that (i) no (or
only a partial) correlation between the other players’ actions and types is assumed
and (ii) bidders still best-respond given their beliefs. Hence, for a “cursed” bidder
the information on whether his bid is higher or lower than the bid of the opponent,
does not provide him further information which would be relevant for updating his
bid. For fully cursed bidders this argument is straightforward, but it also holds for
partly cursed bidders because of the best-response assumption. By definition, the
bid of a cursed bidder is already evaluated conditional on winning in stage I, albeit
a partly cursed bidder implicitly assumes that winning is less informative than in
equilibrium. This means, the feedback of winning in stage II provides no further
relevant information, since it is already included in the decision of a partly cursed
bidder in stage I.
The reason for choosing the wallet game, instead of a more standard model for
common value auctions, is that in this game a na¨ıve bidding strategy can lead to both
8See also Esponda and Vespa (2016) for a distinction between static and dynamic choice situa-
tions.
7
over- and underbidding, relative to the symmetric equilibrium strategy, depending
on whether the private signal is low or high. In this sense, there can be both a
winner’s and a loser’s curse (see also Holt and Sherman, 1994).9 This property is
useful for two reasons. First, I am able to control for psychological explanations,
stating that the winner’s curse is mainly driven by emotional factors of winning (see,
for example, Van den Bos, Li, Lau, Maskin, Cohen, Montague, and McClure, 2008;
Astor, Adam, Ja¨hnig, and Seifert, 2013). Second, and more importantly, I am able
to check whether bid shading in stage II is due to proper Bayesian updating or just
a rule of thumb when learning that a certain bid was the winning bid. In my setup,
bid shading is only advisable for low signals, but not for high signals. Thus, the
subjects have to differentiate between these two kinds of signals, instead of following
the simple decision rule “decrease your bid, when you learn that your bid was the
winning bid”.
The findings of my thesis reveal two important observations:
(i) Bidders are more likely to avoid the winner’s curse and the loser’s curse in
stage II when they are informed whether their bid is the winning bid or not, given
that the respective information has a sufficiently high predictive power concerning
the opponent’s signal. This suggests that the crucial cognitive hurdle for bidders in
a common value auction is not forming beliefs about the opponents’ behavior, but
identifying the relevant states to condition on in the first place.
(ii) Information can also be negative for the bidders, depending on the context.
The subjects in my experiment differentiated only imperfectly between situations in
which decreasing (increasing) a bid is rational and those in which it is not and they
often used simple heuristics instead of making strategic changes. This behavior
might be partly explained by an actual joy of winning or, to be more precise, a
disappointment of losing. When subjects learned that they lost an auction in stage I,
most of them increased their bid in stage II, regardless of having a low or high private
signal. Conversely, when subjects learned that they won an auction in stage I, they
acted more strategically and bids for low signals were decreased at a much higher
rate compared to bids for high signals (78.7% vs. 42.3%).
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.1 will provide an overview about
the current literature closely related to my research topic. Section 2.2 will present
the underlying theoretical model for the experiment. Section 2.3 describes the ex-
perimental design. Section 2.4 presents and discusses the results of the experiment.
Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
9A loser’s curse can be understood as losing an auction, but the bidder could have won with a
positive payoff.
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2.1 Literature review
This thesis is the first to investigate the direct effect of the information of winning
(or losing) in the context of a common value auction. The novelty of my design
is that I use a dynamic choice setting a` la Esponda and Vespa (2014) in a sealed
bid auction. Similar to them, I want to differentiate between mistakes in hypotheti-
cal thinking and problems with extracting information from the opponents’ actions.
With this setup I am able to test whether potential errors in common value auctions
occur due to an inability of performing contingent reasoning or due to inconsistent
beliefs as proposed by cursed equilibrium. To the best of my knowledge, none of the
recent approaches provided a similar framework. For example, the experiment by
Charness and Levin (2009) is a single decision maker problem in an adverse selection
environment. Additionally, they measured the effect of contingent reasoning only
indirectly by transforming their initial game into a set of simple lotteries. Ivanov,
Levin, and Niederle (2010) showed that belief-based models, like cursed equilibrium,
might be not that powerful in explaining the winner’s curse, but they provided no
alternative explanation. The paper of Koch and Penczynski (2018) is also closely re-
lated to my work. So far they are the only ones who combined contingent reasoning
and belief-based models in their experiment. However, they focused on a different
aspect of contingent reasoning, not directly related to the event of winning an auc-
tion. Finally, Levin, Peck, and Ivanov (2016) used Dutch auctions and showed that
in this format conditioning on winning is more salient compared to a strategically
equivalent first-price auction. All of these papers will be discussed in more detail in
the following part.
As explained above, the paper most closely related to my own work is the one by
Esponda and Vespa (2014). They created a common value voting experiment where
a subject interacted with two computers. The main task for the subject was to
submit a vote for a ball which was either red or blue. Due to the commonly known
voting algorithm of the computers, the vote of the subject was only relevant when
the ball was blue and, hence, the optimal choice for the subject was always to vote for
blue. Esponda and Vespa (2014) observed that subjects made significantly less errors
in a sequential election, where the voters knew whether they were pivotal or not,
compared to a simultaneous election, where the voters were not informed about their
pivotality. Similarly, in their lab experiment Ngangoue´ and Weizsa¨cker (2015) found
that traders in a financial market setting performed better in a sequential trading
mechanism where no Bayesian updating on hypothetical events was required.
Charness and Levin (2009) conducted an experiment constructed as a simple
individual choice problem similar to an acquiring a company game, which is based
on a lemon market (Akerlof, 1970), to investigate the driving mechanisms behind
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the winner’s curse. The results of their paper revealed that most of the subjects sys-
tematically overbid even though the strategy of the computerized seller was known
and, hence, there was no need for the subjects to form beliefs about his behav-
ior. This pattern was reduced in a setting where the bidding task was transformed
into a set of simple lotteries with no requirement of thinking in hypothetical situa-
tions. However, transforming the initial game into a simple lottery task changes the
whole structure of the game and so it remains difficult to extract a causal effect of
hypothetical thinking.
Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle (2010) used a similar approach as Charness and
Levin (2009), but they conducted their experiment in an actual auction context us-
ing the maximal game.10 The aim of their experiment was not to look at the effect
of contingent reasoning, but rather to disprove that the winner’s curse is driven by
inconsistent beliefs. Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle (2010) observed significant over-
bidding which was not reduced in a modified setting of the maximal game where
the beliefs of the participants were explicitly formed and, thus, belief-based models,
like cursed equilibrium, had little explanatory power. However, Costa-Gomes and
Shimoji (2015) criticized Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle (2010) for the misuse of some
of the game theoretical concepts, arguing that some of their findings can indeed be
explained by belief-based models. Similarly, Camerer, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2016)
argued that the observed behavior of the subjects in Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle
(2010) can be explained by belief-based models if they are combined with a quantal
response model. Under this extension the assumption of perfect best-reply behavior
in cursed equilibrium and level-k model is relaxed and stochastic choices are allowed.
They showed that this extended model fits very well to the data of Ivanov, Levin,
and Niederle (2010).11
My approach is different from the one in Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle (2010).
Rather than showing that bidders do not best-respond, even though their beliefs are
explicitly formed, I show that bidders in my setup react to information which is, by
definition, not relevant for the updating process of a “cursed” bidder.12
Koch and Penczynski (2018) conducted an auction game similar to the one in
10Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle (2010) criticized that the acquiring a company game, used in
Charness and Levin (2009), represents a lemon market and not a common value auction. Thus,
it seems problematic to extend the findings from their experiment to common value auctions in
general. They also claimed that it can make a difference whether a subject plays against other
people or against a computer. In fact, Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle (2010) also used a computer
treatment, but in their case the computer mimicked the subject’s own past strategy.
11However, Camerer, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2016) also assume that, if the perfect best-reply
assumption of cursed equilibrium and level-k model is maintained, these models are very bad in
predicting the behavior in maximal value games.
12In the setup of Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle (2010) one could still argue that the belief formation
of a cursed bidder takes place in an isolated “black box” and is not affected by information about
the opponent’s behavior which is given to such a bidder. This is not an issue in my design.
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Kagel and Levin (1986) to investigate how explanations concerning contingent rea-
soning and belief-based models interact. The authors found that the relaxation of
both cognitive requirements had a significant effect on avoiding the winner’s curse.
To identify the effect of contingent reasoning on the bidding behavior of the subjects,
the authors used a transformed version of the original game, where both bidders re-
ceived the same information about an object with a stochastic value, instead of
different private signals. In this sense, there was no need for the bidders to con-
dition on whether their own signal was relatively low or high. This is different
from my approach, where I focus on the direct effect of the information of winning
an auction. Additionally, I only changed one parameter in stage II, whereas Koch
and Penczynski (2018) used two different games, but with the same best-response
functions and equilibria.
Levin, Peck, and Ivanov (2016) used an experiment to investigate the impact of
Bayesian updating and non-probabilistic reasoning (referred to as contingent reason-
ing in this thesis) on avoiding the winner’s curse. They used common value Dutch
and common value first-price auctions based on the model in Kagel, Harstad, and
Levin (1987) and compared both versions to quantify the effect of non-probabilistic
reasoning. Additionally, they measured the skills of the participants in Bayesian
updating and non-probabilistic reasoning through a questionnaire, which the sub-
jects had to answer before they participated in the auctions, and showed that both
cognitive skills had a significant effect on avoiding the winner’s curse, resulting in
higher earnings for the subjects. The authors also showed that subjects performed
better in a Dutch auction, where the auction ended when the first subject stopped
the clock, compared to a Dutch auction, where the auction ended when the last
subject stopped the clock and no subject received any feedback about whether he is
the highest bidder. In the first setting, a bidder knows, in the moment of stopping
the clock, that he is the highest bidder and, hence, it is more salient for him to con-
dition his bid on winning compared to the second setting with a “silent” clock. The
authors concluded that bidders can better handle the winner’s curse if the require-
ments for this form of hypothetical thinking are reduced.13 Note that this form of a
Dutch auction is not comparable to the sequential approach of Esponda and Vespa
(2014) because, strictly speaking, only after stopping the clock the subject learns
that he is the highest bidder.14 The advantage of my design is that the bidders in
stage II receive this information before they have to come up with a bid.
13As a further robustness check, the authors also used private-value auctions, where they did
not find a significant difference between these two kinds of Dutch auctions.
14A further problem of Dutch auctions is that the bidders have to make a decision pressed for
time. This can lead to various effects on emotional level (see, for example, Adam, Kra¨mer, and
Weinhardt, 2012; Adam, Kra¨mer, and Mu¨ller, 2015).
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2.2 The model
In the following section I present a formal description of the auction game used in
the experiment. This game is based on the wallet game proposed by Klemperer
(1998) and the model used in Avery and Kagel (1997). Henceforth, this game will
be denoted as the wallet game, although it is slightly different from the original
one.15
There are two players, indexed by i = 1, 2. Each player i receives a signal xi from
the set X = {0, 1, . . . , 9, 10, 50, 51, . . . , 59, 60} (|X| = 22), with each value equally
likely and with replacement (so there are 11 low and 11 high signals). The players
compete for an object worth v = x1 + x2 in a second-price sealed bid auction. The
players are allowed to choose a bid bi in the range of [0, 120], with only integer values
possible. In case of a tie, the player with the higher signal wins. If the signals are
also equal, both players receive a payoff of 0. The payoff of player 1 (analogously
for player 2) is thus given by:
π1 =


x1 + x2 − b2 if b1 > b2
x1 + x2 − b2 if b1 = b2 ∧ x1 > x2
0 otherwise
(1)
The utility function of both players is assumed to be symmetric across i such that
ui(x) = v = x1 + x2 with x = [x1, x2]
T (see also Crawford and Iriberri, 2007).
Proposition 1. Given that player i sees a signal xi, the expected value of the object
is given by E[V |Xi = xi] = xi + 30.
The proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward and, hence, omitted. Henceforth,
bidding according to bi(xi) = xi + 30 will be denoted as na¨ıve bidding, since the
bid is not evaluated conditional on winning. It is easy to show that this bidding
function cannot be part of a symmetric equilibrium. For example, a na¨ıve bidder
with a low signal (xi ∈ {0, . . . , 10}) only wins when the other na¨ıve player also has
a low signal and the price to pay is always above (or equal to) 30, which results in
a negative payoff for the winning bidder.
Proposition 2. Bidding b1(x1) = α · x1 and b2(x2) =
α
α−1
· x2 are equilibrium
strategies for any α > 1. For α = 2 we have the unique symmetric equilibrium with
bi(xi) = 2 · xi for all i ∈ {1, 2}.
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix B.16 The intuitive expla-
15A detailed analysis of the general wallet game with N bidders can be found in Eyster and
Rabin (2005) and Crawford and Iriberri (2007).
16The proof of uniqueness of the symmetric equilibrium is not presented in this thesis, but it
can be found in Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Crawford and Iriberri (2007) for the general wallet
game.
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nation for the symmetric equilibrium is the following: under the assumption that
all bidders have the same bidding function bi(xi), which is monotonically increasing
in xi, a rational player anticipates that he only wins if his signal is at least as high
as the signal of the opponent, thus, barely if x1 = x2 holds. Hence, the optimal
bid in (the symmetric) equilibrium is given by bi(xi) = 2 · xi. Henceforth, bidding
according to bi(xi) = 2 ·xi will be denoted as sophisticated bidding. Note that these
equilibrium strategies are neither affected by risk preferences nor the distribution of
the signals x1 and x2 (see also Klemperer, 1998).
Proposition 3. Any bid bi(xi) outside the interval [xi, xi+60] is weakly dominated.
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in Appendix B. The intuitive explanation
is the following: bidding below the private signal can never be optimal in a second-
price auction because the value of the good is at least xi. Bidding above xi + 60 is,
likewise, never optimal, since the maximal value of the good is at most xi + 60.
Proposition 4. All equilibria from Proposition 2, except the symmetric one with
α = 2, involve weakly dominated bids for one player for at least some signals.
The proof of Proposition 4 can be found in Appendix B. Because of this issue,
asymmetric equilibria are less plausible, since they involve weakly dominated bids
for at least some xi (for one player). Additionally, some bids resulting from a
bidding function bi(xi) = α ·xi with α > 2 are not even feasible because the bidding
range is restricted on the interval [0, 120]. Consequently, throughout the analysis
of this thesis, I will only focus on the symmetric equilibrium, with bi(xi) = 2 · xi,
as a benchmark for sophisticated bidding. Hence, we have the following benchmark
bidding functions for na¨ıve (NVE) and sophisticated (BNE) bidding:
bNV Ei (xi) = xi + 30 (2)
and
bBNEi (xi) = 2 · xi. (3)
At this point it seems important to explain the reasons for choosing a modified
model of the wallet game, with discrete signal space and a gap in the middle, instead
of a continuous range between 0 and 60. First, in the original wallet game, the na¨ıve
and sophisticated bidding functions get closer, the more one reaches the middle of
the signal space. For the value in the middle, which would be 30 in a continuous
range, both bidding functions are even identical. Thus, in the original wallet game,
it gets more difficult to distinguish between na¨ıve and sophisticated bidding for
these intermediate values. Second, in my setup the sophisticated bidding strategy
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is also a best-response for the na¨ıve bidding strategy. So even if a sophisticated
player assumes that his opponent bids na¨ıvely, he still best-responds by using the
sophisticated bidding function. The intuition is simple: if the other player uses the
na¨ıve bidding strategy, the best-response is to always win for high signals and to
always lose for low signals. This is given when following the sophisticated bidding
rule. This makes bBNEi (xi) = 2 · xi a stronger and more credible benchmark for
sophisticated bidding, although it is still not a weakly dominant strategy.
As a concluding remark it is important to note that bidding bi(xi) = xi + 30
can be explained by both: mistakes in contingent reasoning and cursed equilibrium
or level-k model (Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Crawford and Iriberri, 2007).17 This
elucidates a general dilemma in behavioral and experimental economics: even though
a model fits well to the data, it is not clear whether it has indeed explanatory power.
Hence, it remains important to disentangle competing theories.
2.3 Experimental design
2.3.1 Implementation
The experiment was conducted in the Regensburg Economics Science Lab (RESL)
in February 2017. For the technical implementation the software zTree was used
(Fischbacher, 2007) and for the recruitment of participants the online recruitment
system ORSEE was used (Greiner, 2004). In total, 5 sessions were conducted with
overall 72 participants (mostly undergraduate students from various fields). For
each session I had between 10 and 18 participants (always an even number).
The experimental currency unit (ECU) used in the experiment were Taler. All
signals and bids in the experiment were expressed in terms of Taler. The exchange
rate was 1 Euro = 10 Taler. The participants were payed out in Euro at the end of
the experiment. The average payment was 16.02 Euro. The sessions lasted between
60 and 75 minutes.
At the beginning of the experiment each participant was endowed with 50 Taler.
At the end of the experiment, the participants received their initial endowment plus
(minus) their generated earnings (losses) in both stages of the experiment (in total
6 rounds were payoff-relevant). Additionally, a show-up fee of 4 Euro was payed to
each subject which was guaranteed no matter what decisions the subject made dur-
ing the experiment. So each subject earned at least 4 Euro. If the losses exceeded
50 Taler, the participants only received their show-up fee. 4 out of 72 participants
suffered from higher losses.
17A bidder who does not condition his bid on winning, ignores the adverse selection issue inherent
in this kind of auction and only considers his private signal and a “cursed” bidder implicitly assumes
that the opponent will bid independently of his signal which makes bi(xi) = xi+30 a best-response.
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2.3.2 Basic setup
The experiment is divided into two stages, both of which are payoff-relevant. The
subjects are informed that there is a second stage, but they receive the details only
after finishing stage I. In stage I, the players participate in 15 rounds of the wallet
game (i.e., each subject receives successively 15 random signals drawn from the
set X = {0, 1, . . . , 9, 10, 50, 51, . . . , 59, 60} with replacement).18 Each subject gets
randomly matched with another subject of the group (e.g., subject k and subject l).
In this sense, the first signal of subject k is matched with the first signal of subject l ,
the second signal of k is matched with the second signal of l, and so on. The subjects
are aware that they play against a fixed stranger for the course of the 15 rounds.19
The subjects receive no immediate feedback after submitting their bids, but only
learn their payoff at the very end of the experiment (i.e., after finishing stage II).
So there should be neither endowment effects nor learning effects through explicit
feedback. Three randomly selected rounds are payoff-relevant. A typical decision
screen of stage I is shown by Figure A.1 in Appendix A.
Before starting with the actual task, all participants are asked to answer eight
control questions (see Appendix D) and to participate in five testing rounds of the
wallet game without monetary payoff, but with immediate feedback about their
hypothetical payoff after each bid, to give them a practical understanding of the
game. However, the subjects receive no feedback about the bid or the signal of
the opponent. The opponent in the testing rounds is represented by a computer
who uses the bidding strategy bj(xj) = xj + 30. The participants are not explicitly
informed about the strategy of the computer and they only learn that the bidding
function of the computer is monotonically increasing in his signal.20
Stage II is, from a theoretical point of view, a repetition of stage I. All sub-
jects receive the same 15 signals as in stage I, in the same order. In stage II, the
subjects play against a computerized opponent who mimics the behavior of their
former opponent from stage I. Subject k plays against the decisions of subject l
in stage I and vice versa. Each subject therefore faces exactly the same decision
18The actual explanation in the experiment is that each player receives an envelope with a
random amount of money inside (see Instructions in Appendix C).
19Since the subjects received no feedback after submitting their bids, I did not use a random
matching approach in which the opponent would change after each round.
20The reason for using the na¨ıve bidding function as a strategy for the computer in the testing
rounds is that deviating from the sophisticated bidding function bBNE
i
(xi) = 2 · xi is much more
harmful when the other player uses the na¨ıve bidding function. If the computer had used the
sophisticated bidding function, the subjects would have been less likely to realize that deviating
from this strategy is a bad idea. In the presented setup bBNE
i
(xi) = 2 · xi is a best-response for
both the na¨ıve and the sophisticated bidding function.
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problems as in stage I if we abstract from social preferences.21 As in stage I, the
bids and the signals of the opponent are not observable. The rules for bidding and
winning are the same as in stage I and the same three randomly selected rounds are
again payoff-relevant. In stage II, the subjects are randomly (and with equal like-
lihood) assigned to either treatment INF (information) or NOINF (no information).
2.3.3 Treatments
INF (Information)
The subjects who receive treatment INF are able to see for each signal whether their
initial bid from stage I was HIGHER or LOWER than the respective bid of the op-
ponent.22 For example if a subjects sees that her initial bid of bIi = z¯ was HIGHER
than the bid of his opponent, she knows that submitting a bid of bIIi = z ≥ z¯ results
in winning the auction for sure. Conversely, if a subjects sees that his bid bIi = ¯
z was
LOWER than the bid of his opponent, he knows that submitting a bid of bIIi = z < ¯
z
results in losing the auction for sure. In this sense, there is no requirement anymore
to condition on the hypothetical event of winning (or losing) for a certain range of
bids, especially for the bid which was considered as optimal in stage I. An example
of a typical screen is given by Figure A.2 in Appendix A.
NOINF (No information)
The subjects in treatment NOINF face exactly the same situation as those in treat-
ment INF, except that they do not get any information about the bid of their
opponent. Instead of HIGHER or LOWER they only see ??? on their screen. How-
ever, all subjects are informed about both treatments (i.e., the subjects in NOINF
know how treatment INF looks like and vice versa). An example of a typical screen
is given by Figure A.3 in Appendix A. The general structure of the treatments is
illustrated by Figure 2.1.
21In contrast to stage I, the decisions do not affect the payoff of the opponent anymore. So
if a subject has preferences concerning the other player’s payoff, the decision problem might be
different for him.
22If the bids are equal, the subjects also get the message “LOWER”, so LOWER means lower
or equal.
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Wallet game
(k ↔ l)
15 rounds
15 rounds
15 rounds
Stage I Stage II
INF
NOINF
Wallet game +
information
(k → l)
Wallet game
(k → l)
p = 0.5
1 - p = 0.5
Figure 2.1: Illustration of the treatments
2.3.4 Behavioral predictions
The following behavioral predictions are based on the assumption of a boundedly
rational agent who is cognitively limited in the sense that he is not able to infer
information from hypothetical events, like winning or losing an auction. Such an
agent will be denoted as na¨ıve.23 A na¨ıve bidder will behave as if the auction is a
private value auction since he ignores the adverse selection in the event of winning
(for low signals) and the positive selection in the event of losing (for high signals) and
will choose a bid that is based on the expected value of the good if he is risk-neutral.
Hence, he will bid bi(xi) = xi + 30 for any given signal.
If all bidders behave like this, there will always be a winner’s curse for the bidders
who win with a low signal (xi ∈ {0, . . . , 10}), since they only win when the other
player also has a low signal and the price to pay is always above (or equal to) 30.
Conversely, all bidders who lose with a high signal (xi ∈ {50, . . . , 60}) fall prey to a
loser’s curse, since they could have won the auction at a profitable price.
How will such a cognitively limited agent react, when he receives the information
HIGHER or LOWER - i.e., when he learns whether his ex ante, as optimally con-
sidered bid, is the winning bid or not? If such an agent is able to correctly extract
information form observed events, which implies that he has consistent beliefs about
the behavior of the opponent, he should update his bids at least for some constel-
lations of signal and information. Consider therefore Table 2.1 and two players, 1
and 2. Player 1 is a na¨ıve bidder who bids according to b1(x1) = x1 + 30 in stage I.
Player 2 is the opponent of player 1. As a minimum requirement for rationality,
player 2 does not use any weakly dominated bids.24 The first columns show the four
23Note that this thesis will not provide a generalizable formal model of na¨ıve behavior as it can
be found, for example, in Li (2017).
24This means for each x2 he may choose any bid in a range of [x2, x2 + 60]. So, for low signals
the bid can be in a range of [0, 70] and for high signals in a range of [50, 120].
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different constellations of signal and information that can occur in the experiment
from the perspective of player 1. The constellations are abbreviated by the form
sT , with s ∈ {ls, hs} (low or high signal) and T ∈ {L,H} (information LOWER or
HIGHER). The last column shows the prediction of player 2’s signal when player 1
receives the respective information and given that he believes that his opponent does
not use any weakly dominated bids.
Proposition 5. If a player bids according to bi(xi) = xi+30 in stage I and the other
player does not use any weakly dominated bids, he can predict in stage II whether
the signal of the other player is low or high when (i) he wins with a low signal or
(ii) he loses with a high signal.
Constellation Signal Information Prediction of other’s signal
lsH Low signal HIGHER Low signal
lsL Low signal LOWER Low or high signal
hsH High signal HIGHER Low or high signal
hsL High signal LOWER High signal
Table 2.1: Prediction of other player’s signal for different constellations
The proof of Proposition 5 is provided in Appendix B. We can see that for
constellations lsH and hsL the respective information provides unambiguous hints
about the opponent’s signal for player 1. While for these constellations the weak
assumption of an opponent who does not use any weakly dominated bids is sufficient
to correctly predict his signal (low or high)25, this is not the case for constellations
lsL and hsH where the probabilities for a low or high signal depend on the specific
bidding function of the opponent. So for the latter two constellations a sophis-
ticated computation of probabilities is required to predict the expected value of
the opponent’s signal correctly. Based on this, clear predictions can be made for
constellations lsH and hsL, but not for constellations lsL and hsH .
• In constellations lsH and hsL, bidders will update their bids in stage II, result-
ing in bids closer to the Nash prediction and higher earnings for the subjects.
• For constellations lsL and hsH , the behavior of the bidders can be ambiguous
since the expected value of the opponent’s signal depends on the specific beliefs
of the bidders and the updating process requires non-trivial computations.
25To be more precise: for constellations lsH and hsL it is sufficient to assume that player 2 does
not bid more than x2+60 for low signals (no weakly dominated overbidding) and not less than x2
for high signals (no weakly dominated underbidding). Since 91.94% of all bids in stage I fall into
this category, this is actually a plausible belief.
18
As a concluding remark, it is important to note that cursed equilibrium cannot
explain an updating of bids in stage II, since a “cursed” bidder implicitly assumes
that the opponent chooses a bid which is independent of his signal, hence, the
respective information would not be useful for such a bidder.26
2.4 Results
In this section, the results of the experiment will be presented. First, I will give a
descriptive overview about the overall bidding pattern in stage I, before the subjects
are assigned to a treatment group. Second, I will present the effects of the infor-
mation treatment (INF) in terms of bidding behavior and the resulting profits.27
Finally, I will provide evidence that the observed behavior is to a not negligible
extent driven by an actual updating of the opponent’s signal, when receiving infor-
mation which is not hypothetical anymore, and not because the subjects followed
a simple decision rule like “always decrease when you see HIGHER and always in-
crease when you see LOWER”. Additionally, I will also provide an analysis on the
subject level, where I classify subjects into different categories based on their bidding
behavior.
All bids and profits in the following part are expressed in terms of experimental
currency units (ECU) with an exchange rate of 1 Euro = 10 ECU.
2.4.1 Overall bidding pattern in stage I
Figure 2.2 presents the mean and median bids for low and high signals in stage I. The
average bids for low signals are above the Nash prediction and the average bids for
high signals are below the Nash prediction in stage I. For high signals the mean and
median bids are fitted very well by the na¨ıve bidding function bNV Ei (xi) = xi + 30.
The results of a Wilcoxon sign rank test show that for high signals the hypothesis
that the actual bids are equal to bids resulting from the na¨ıve bidding function
cannot be rejected (p = 0.624).28
26Eyster and Rabin (2005) argued that cursed equilibrium is basically not defined for sequential
games and that players in sequential games might be less “cursed” than in simultaneous games.
However, in my setup the players only observe whether their bid was higher or lower than the bid
of the opponent, but they do not observe the specific action of the other player, as, for example, in
an ascending bid auction. Additionally, it can be argued that the concept of “cursedness” would
be a rather weak one if “cursedness” would suddenly vanish in the moment of revealing the other
player’s action (see also Deversi, Ispano, and Schwardmann (2018)).
27When I compare the effects between INF and NOINF, for different constellations of signal and
information, I look at those subjects in treatment NOINF who would have received the respective
information if they had been in treatment INF, in order to get an appropriate control group.
28Graphs reporting all bids in stage I and II can be found in Appendix A (Distribution of bids).
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Figure 2.2: Median and mean bids in stage I
Overall, we can observe a high occurrence of the winner’s curse for low signals
(16.67% in stage I) and of the loser’s curse for high signals (17.02% in stage I).
Conditional on winning, the rate for the winner’s curse increases to 59.31% for low
signals and conditional on losing, the rate for the loser’s curse increases to 56.47%
for high signals. The rate of the winner’s curse is very high, especially when consid-
ering that the auctions were conducted as second-price auctions. This shows clearly
that the problem of irrational bidding behavior is a considerable one. A further
conclusion is that emotional factors of winning seem to play a minor role in stage I,
since the rates for winner’s and loser’s curse are very similar.
Low (LOST) Low (WON) Low High (LOST) High (WON) High
No curse 338 59 397 74 378 452
91.11% 40.69% 76.94% 43.53% 95.94% 80.14%
Winner’s curse 0 86 86 0 16 16
0.00% 59.31% 16.67% 0.00% 4.06% 2.84%
Loser’s curse 33 0 33 96 0 96
8.89% 0.00% 6.40% 56.47% 0.00% 17.02%
Total 371 145 516 170 394 564
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Table 2.2: Winner’s curse and loser’s curse in Stage I for different constellations of
signals. Winner’s curse: won, but with a negative payoff. Loser’s curse: lost, but
could have won the auction with a positive payoff.
2.4.2 Bidding behavior in stage II
In this subsection, I present an analysis of the difference in bidding behavior be-
tween stage I and II and across treatments. First, I will illustrate my findings by
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providing cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the bids in stage I and II
for different constellations of signal and information for both treatments INF and
NOINF. Second, I will support my claims by means of a regression analysis.
As explained in Section 2.2, the symmetric Nash bidding function bBNEi (xi) =
2 · xi serves as a benchmark for sophisticated bidding. However, since it might be
too much to expect that subjects follow exactly the symmetric Nash bidding rule, I
will define a broader corridor for sophisticated bids which I call Nash range. Hereby,
I lower the requirements for sophisticated bidding, by only checking whether the
subjects are able to reason on the level of signal categories (low and high signals).
Bids are in the Nash range for low signals as long as b(xi) ∈ [xi, xi + 10] holds.
In this sense all bids will be classified as sophisticated, where a subject with a low
signal realizes that she should bid as if the other player has a low signal as well. For
high signals, bids are in the Nash range as long as b(xi) ∈ [xi + 50, xi + 60] holds.
Equivalently, all bids for which the subject realizes that with a high signal, he should
bid as if the other player also has a high signal, are classified as sophisticated bids.
The lower and upper bounds of bids in the Nash range are, hence, 0 and 20 for
low signals, and 100 and 120 for high signals, respectively. These are also the lower
and upper bounds of the symmetric Nash bidding function bBNEi (xi) = 2 · xi, which
is embedded in the corridor of the Nash range. This pattern is also illustrated by
Figure A.7 in Appendix A. The bids which are not in the Nash range are defined as
unsophisticated (see also Figure 2.3).29
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120
Unsophisticated bids
Possible Nash bids (low signals) Possible Nash bids (high signals)
Figure 2.3: Range of unsophisticated and sophisticated bids
In the following graphs, presenting the distribution of bids in stage I and II, the
vertical line marks the upper bound of Nash bids for low signals (bi = 20) and the
lower bound of Nash bids for high signals (bi = 100), respectively.
Most noticeable are the changes in bids in constellations lsH and hsL for the
subjects in treatment INF (Figures 2.4 (left side) and 2.5 (right side)). We can see
that in those constellations, the mass of bids in stage II is shifted towards the Nash
prediction and that a substantially larger proportion of the bids in stage II is now
29Note here that not all bids between 0 and 20 or between 100 and 120, respectively, are always
in the Nash range. E.g., if a player has a signal of 5, only bids between 5 and 15 are in the Nash
range. All other bids would be classified as unsophisticated in this context.
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actually within the Nash range, compared to stage I. For the other constellations
in treatment INF (lsL and hsH), the effect is reverse, albeit the changes are less
distinct (see Figures 2.4 (right side) and 2.5 (left side)). Here the mass of bids is
shifted to the right for low signals and to the left for high signals - hence, in both
cases further away from the Nash prediction. For constellation lsL we see that the
bids in the Nash range substantially decreased in stage II. The bids in the NOINF
treatment were also changed, although the subjects received no information about
their bids, but here the pattern is less distinct and uniform.
Figure 2.4: Cumulative distribution functions - Low signals
Figure 2.5: Cumulative distribution functions - High signals
In the left part of Figure 2.4 we can see that there is an accumulation of bids
below 20 in stage II for low signals, when receiving the information HIGHER (treat-
ment INF). 60.66% of all bids in this constellation are lower or equal to 20. If we
only look at the subset of bids that were actually decreased, 72.92% of these newly
selected bids are below or equal to 20. This in fact indicates that the subjects who
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decreased their bids seem to realize that if they win with a low signal, the other
player has most likely a low signal as well and, hence, they bid exactly for this case
(if both players have low signals, the maximal value of the good is 20). Equivalently,
for high signals paired with the information LOWER there should be an accumu-
lation of bids above 100, when the subjects realize that the other player has most
likely a high signal, when losing with a high signal (if both players have high signals,
the minimal value of the good is 100). For this constellation, a slight accumulation
is still noticeable even though it is less distinct. Here only 42.53% of the newly
selected bids, which are higher than before, are above or equal to 100.
I also used a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to check whether the distributions of
bids in stage I and II are equal for the different constellations. The results of the
test showed that in treatment INF the null hypothesis of equal distributions was
always rejected (lsH : p = 0.000, lsL: p = 0.000, hsH : p = 0.002, hsL: p = 0.000).
On the other hand, for treatment NOINF, the null hypothesis was only rejected for
constellation lsH , based on a significance level of 5% (lsH : p = 0.020, lsL: p = 0.136,
hsH : p > 0.999, hsL: p = 0.069).30
Bid is in Nash range in stage II (YES [1] or NO [0])
lsH lsL hsH hsL H L Overall
INF 0.361∗∗∗ -0.142 -0.046 0.072 0.047 -0.074 -0.012
(0.123) (0.088) (0.059) (0.110) (0.046) (0.070) (0.046)
Constant 0.114 0.293∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.145∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.079) (0.049) (0.076) (0.038) (0.059) (0.038)
Observations 140 376 391 173 531 549 1080
Subjects 49 70 70 50 70 70 72
R2 0.162 0.029 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.008 0.000
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors (on the subject-level) are in parentheses. Constellation
lsH stands for low signals paired with the information HIGHER. Constellation L stands for all
signals paired with the information LOWER. The other constellations are defined analogously.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2.3: Regression Table - Bid in Nash range (Stage II)
To support the claim that bidders in treatment INF significantly improved their
30It is important to note that by using the standard Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, I cannot say
whether one distribution first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) the other one. For this
purpose, I would have to consider the test of Barrett and Donald (2003) (special thanks to an
anonymous reviewer who pointed this out). For the further analysis, I will, however, focus on
an OLS regression model in order to provide a more rigorous comparison of the bidding behavior
between the two treatments across stage I and II.
23
bids in some constellations, compared to the control group NOINF, I ran an OLS
regression analysis with clustered standard errors on the subject-level, where I tested
whether the bids in treatment INF are more often in the Nash range in stage II,
compared to NOINF. The results are presented in Table 2.3.
As we can see there is only a significant effect for constellation lsH . This effect is
quite large, indicating that the number of bids in the Nash range in treatment INF
is by around 36.1 percentage points larger compared to NOINF. As a placebo test,
I ran the same regression for the bids in stage I, before the treatment intervention
(see Table A.1 in Appendix A). Here we see no significant difference between the
treatments, except for constellation hsL, where we find a small, but significantly
negative coefficient. This effect might be explained by small sample properties.
Additionally, Table A.2 in Appendix A reports a further regression, where the
dependent variable indicates whether a bid was shifted from one range to the other
across the stages (shifted from Nash to unsophisticated range (−1); not shifted
from one range to the other (0); shifted from unsophisticated to Nash range (1)).
The results are in line with the findings from Table 2.3. Furthermore, we see that
receiving the information LOWER has an overall negative effect concerning the
changing of bids, i.e., more bids are shifted from Nash to unsophisticated range
than vice versa.
This leads to the following conclusions. If we only look at those constellations
in which the respective information provides a relatively unambiguous hint about
whether the opponent’s signal is low or high (lsH and hsL), the information treat-
ment (INF) leads to a significant improvement of the bids in constellation lsH but
not hsL, where the coefficient is also positive, but not significant. For the other
constellations there seems to be a reverse effect, which is, however, (i) not signifi-
cant for hsH , and (ii) for lsL only significant in the specification where I look at the
shifting of bids across the bidding ranges (see Table A.2).
2.4.3 Profits
The profits of the bidders are calculated as defined by equation (1) in Section 2.2.
The change in profits from stage I to stage II for individual i in round m is then
given by
∆πim = π
II
im − π
I
im (4)
Hence, a positive value of ∆πim implies that the subject’s payoff increased from
stage I to stage II, whereas a negative value implies the opposite. Table 2.4 reports
OLS regressions with clustered standard errors, testing whether the information
treatment (INF) has a significant effect on the changes in profits from stage I to
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stage II for different constellations of signal and information.
Overall, we can see that the change in average profits follows the same pattern
as the deviation from the Nash bid: if the subjects bid closer to the Nash prediction
in stage II, their profits increase, and vice versa. However, the effects, although
pointing into the right direction, are only significant for constellations hsH and hsL
and here only at the 10%-level. The coefficient in constellation hsL indicates that
the subjects in treatment INF increased their profits per auction from stage I to
stage II by 5.115 ECU, on average, when they learned that they lost an auction
with a high signal, compared to the subjects in treatment NOINF who did not get
the information of losing. Conversely, in constellation hsH , we can see that the
profits per auction decreased from stage I to stage II by 1.414 ECU, on average,
when learning that the bid for a high signal was the winning bid.
Change in profits
lsH lsL hsH hsL H L Overall
INF 3.773 -1.971 -1.414∗ 5.115∗ -0.469 0.246 -0.158
(4.907) (1.327) (0.758) (2.644) (1.482) (1.284) (1.001)
Constant 2.063 -1.793∗ -0.205 0.566 0.498 -1.046 -0.251
(4.534) (0.982) (0.207) (1.388) (1.396) (0.796) (0.856)
Observations 140 376 391 173 531 549 1080
Subjects 49 70 70 50 70 70 72
R2 0.014 0.010 0.015 0.043 0.001 0.000 0.000
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors (on the subject-level) are in parentheses. Constellation
lsH stands for low signals paired with the information HIGHER. Constellation L stands
for all signals paired with the information LOWER. The other constellations are defined
analogously.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2.4: Regression Table - Change in profits
A major problem in second-price auctions, however, is that the magnitude of the
profits is affected by the behavior of the opponents. Hence, the very same winning
bid can lead to different profits, depending on the bid of the opponent.31 For this
reason, I also used an alternative and more robust measure for profitability in which
31Consider the following example. Player 1 has a signal of 10 and player 2 has a signal of 5.
Player 1 submits a bid of 40 in the stage I and player 2 submits a bid of 35. Player 1 wins and
his payoff would be −20 in this scenario. If player 1 decreases his bid to 20 in stage II, he receives
a payoff of 0 and improves his payoff by 20 ECU. Now suppose player 2 would have chosen a bid
of 25 in stage I, with everything else exactly as before. Now player 1 improves his payoff by only
10 ECU, when he decreases his bid to 20 in stage II. Hence, in the first scenario the very same
decreasing strategy is twice as profitable.
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any positive payoff is transformed into 1 and any negative payoff is transformed
into −1. In this sense there is only a distinction between whether an auction was
won profitable, unprofitable or lost. Henceforth, I will call this adjusted profit. In
contrast to the actual profit, the magnitude of the adjusted profit is not affected by
the opponent’s bid which makes it a cleaner measure for sophisticated bidding. The
adjusted profit has also a second interpretation: switching auctions with negative
payoff into auctions with zero payoff in stage II refers to overcoming a winner’s
curse. Switching auctions with zero payoff into auctions with positive payoff in
stage II refers to overcoming a loser’s curse. Thus, the change in the adjusted profit
from stage I to stage II can actually be interpreted as the (net) rate of switching
unfavorable auctions into favorable auctions. Table 2.5 reports OLS regressions with
clustered standard errors, testing whether the information treatment (INF) has a
significant effect on the changes in adjusted profits from stage I to stage II, for
different constellations of signal and information.
Change in adjusted profits
lsH lsL hsH hsL H L Overall
INF 0.306∗∗ -0.071∗ -0.050∗∗ 0.190∗∗ 0.025 0.011 0.016
(0.152) (0.041) (0.025) (0.092) (0.041) (0.040) (0.030)
Constant 0.038 -0.061∗∗ -0.006 0.026 0.008 -0.033 -0.012
(0.115) (0.029) (0.006) (0.051) (0.035) (0.024) (0.022)
Observations 140 376 391 173 531 549 1080
Subjects 49 70 70 50 70 70 72
R2 0.074 0.012 0.019 0.039 0.001 0.000 0.000
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors (on the subject-level) are in parentheses. Constellation
lsH stands for low signals paired with the information HIGHER. Constellation L stands for all
signals paired with the information LOWER. The other constellations are defined analogously.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 2.5: Regression Table - Change in adjusted profits
Here we can see a significant effect for all constellations except for the last three,
where low and high signals are pooled, and for the whole sample. For constellations
lsH and hsL there is a significant and positive effect of the information treatment
(INF) on the change in adjusted profits. For example, the coefficient of 0.306 in the
first column can be interpreted in two ways. (i) In constellation lsH , the subjects
in treatment INF have an overall net rate of switching unfavorable auctions into
favorable auctions in stage II, which is by 30.6 percentage points larger than that
of the subjects in treatment NOINF. Or equivalently, (ii) in constellation lsH , the
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subjects in treatment INF increased their adjusted profits per auction from stage I to
stage II by 0.306 units, on average, compared to the subjects in treatment NOINF.
The other coefficients can be interpreted analogously. For constellations lsL and
hsH , there is a negative effect of the information treatment (INF) on the change in
adjusted profits, making the subjects in treatment INF worse off compared to those
in treatment NOINF. However, the positive effects of the information treatment
(INF) are greater in absolute terms than the negative ones and the coefficient for
constellation lsL is only significant at the 10%-level. But since constellations lsL
and hsH occur, by construction of the game, more often than lsH and hsL, the
overall effect of treatment INF is not significantly different from the one of treatment
NOINF. This indicates that, in total, the subjects who received information about
their bids are not better off than those who received no information.
2.4.4 Differentiation between low and high signals
By construction of the game and the observed bidding behavior, it is profitable for
the bidders to increase the initial bid for high signals and to decrease the initial
bid for low signals, in most of the cases. Thus, when receiving either the informa-
tion HIGHER or LOWER it is important to distinguish between those two kinds
of signals instead of following the simple decision rule “decrease when you receive
HIGHER and increase when you receive LOWER”. The results show that when
receiving the information HIGHER, the subjects in treatment INF strongly differ-
entiate between low and high signals. The decrease rate for low signals is 78.7% and
only 42.3% for high signals (p = 0.000, Fisher’s exact test). For the information
LOWER, the subjects in treatment INF do not differentiate between low and high
signals. The increase rate for low signals is 83.0% and 89.7% for high signals. How-
ever, the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.168, Fisher’s exact test).
After receiving the information LOWER, it seems to be very tempting to increase
the initial bid. This can be an indicator of an actual joy of winning (or rather
disappointment of losing), but this is also in line with theories about hypothetical
thinking. If the initial bid was higher, it was actually the relevant bid. If the initial
bid was lower, this is not the case and the subjects have to engage in hypothetical
thinking again before coming up with a new bid.32 For example, a na¨ıve Bayesian
updater might correctly assume that the value of the good is higher than expected
when receiving the information LOWER and increases his initial bid. The problem
is that the new bid is not chosen conditional on winning - this can result in an even
32An alternative explanation for this behavior might be a general misunderstanding of second-
price auctions. However, this point seems less likely, since in the instructions the mechanism of
a second-price auction was explained in detail and the control questions could only be answered
when this mechanism was understood correctly.
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more frequent appearance of the winner’s curse for low signals.
Figure 2.6 reports the fractions of decreasing, increasing and retaining the initial
bids in stage II for different constellations of signal and information for the subjects
in treatment INF.
Figure 2.6: Changing of bids in stage II (treatment INF)
We have already seen that most of the bidders in treatment INF, in constellation
lsH , seem to realize that winning implies that the opponent also has a low signal
and, hence, they select a bid below 20 in stage II. Combined with the pattern that
those subjects seem to differentiate between low and high signals when receiving the
information HIGHER, it seems to be very plausible to assume that the changing
behavior in stage II is to a substantial extent driven by an actual updating of the
opponent’s signal. This is also in line with the answers of a questionnaire, which
was provided after the actual experiment. 79.49% (31 out of 39) of the participants
in treatment INF answered that the information they received helped them indeed
to get a better estimate of the opponent’s signal.
Besides the effect of contingent reasoning, some of the updating in stage II could
be explained by spite preferences. In second-price auctions, some bidders might
tend to overbid in order to decrease the surplus of the opponent. This is especially
the case when the private valuation is low and, hence, the probability of winning
the auction (see, for example, Morgan, Steiglitz, and Reis, 2003; Cooper and Fang,
2008). In stage II, the participants compete against a computer mimicking the
behavior of their former opponent, hence, in stage II, spite plays no role anymore
for the subjects. The prediction therefore would be that the subjects decrease their
bids in stage II, especially for low signals - this is the pattern which I observe. In the
control group NOINF, 25.5% of the bids with low signal were decreased, but only
13.5% of the bids with a high signal. While this would be in line with an explanation
about spite preferences, it has to be noted that both values are considerably smaller
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compared to treatment INF. I.e., if spite would be the main driver behind the
observed behavior, the magnitude of decreased bids in both treatments should be
similar. Additionally, it can be argued that spite cannot explain the high increasing
rate for low signals paired with the information LOWER in stage II, and the frequent
occurrence of underbidding for high signals in stage I.
2.4.5 Cursed equilibrium
A further conclusion that can be derived from the previous results is that the overall
behavior of the subjects in stage II, especially of those in treatment INF, cannot be
explained by cursed equilibrium since a “cursed” bidder assumes by definition that
the bids and signals of the opponent are not correlated. Hence, such a bidder should
not react on the information of winning or losing because he implicitly assumes
that the bid of the opponent provides no valid information about the true value of
the good. Additionally, we have the best-response assumption, inherent in cursed
equilibrium, stating that the bid of a “cursed” player is already evaluated conditional
on winning in stage I. Hence, there would be no need to change the bid in stage II
for such a bidder. As already explained in the beginning, this reasoning holds for
both fully and partly cursed bidders.
I observed that 97.44% of the subjects in treatment INF changed their bids at
least once and that 66.67% of them changed their bids in more than 10 rounds.
In treatment NOINF the changing rate is slightly smaller: 90.91% of the subjects
changed their bids at least once and only 51.52% of them changed their bids in more
than 10 rounds. If we only look at bids that were changed by at least 10 units, the
difference between INF and NOINF is more distinct (see Figure 2.7).33
Figure 2.7: Changing of bids across the rounds
33These graphs report the fractions of subjects who changed their bids in at least X rounds (left)
and in at least X rounds by more than 10 units (right).
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So the best-response assumption is violated for the majority of subjects in both
treatments. If the bid in stage I would have been an optimal bid, given the subject’s
beliefs, there would be no need to change the bid in stage II, since the decision
problem in a given auction is the same in stage II. For the subjects in treatment
INF, we can additionally use the even stronger argument that those subjects actually
recognized the informational content of winning or losing an auction. This pattern
casts doubts on whether the bidding behavior of the majority of subjects can be
explained by cursed equilibrium, unless one assumes that the bidders are suddenly
less cursed in stage II or that a bidder can suffer from both: a cursed system of
beliefs and the inability of thinking in hypothetical situations. However, it is not
clear how or whether the effects of both cognitive mistakes add up. So far, Koch and
Penczynski (2018) are the only ones who looked at both combined in a lab setting,
but more research is needed especially concerning the interaction of both cognitive
mistakes. In general, my findings support the claim of Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle
(2010) who stated that bidders in common value auctions might act “as if” they
have cursed beliefs.34
One obvious concern about the changing behavior of the subjects could be that
some subjects changed their bids out of boredom or some experimenter demand
effects. To rule out boredom effects over the course of the 15 rounds, I also checked
whether the fraction of changed bids increased towards the end of the bidding period
in stage II. As we can see in Figure A.8 (Appendix A) there is no increasing trend
within stage II, but the fraction of changed bids remains, on average, constant.
2.4.6 Analysis on subject level
In this section I will provide a classification of the subjects on an individual level.
The key point of interest is to clarify whether there is a heterogeneity in bidding
behavior. For this purpose, I define the following five bidder types.
Sophisticated: At least 8 of 15 bids are in the Nash range both in stage I and
II, and there are no switches from Nash to unsophisticated range or reverse. I.e.,
these subjects are sophisticated from the beginning and do not benefit from further
information.
Improved: More bids in the Nash range in stage II compared to stage I. Too few
bids in the Nash range in stage I to be qualified as sophisticated. I.e., these subjects
actually profited from the information they received.
Balanced: Same number of bids in Nash range in stage I and II, but at least
two switches between Nash and unsophisticated range across the stages. I.e., these
34Ivanov, Levin, and Niederle (2010) were the first to claim that bidders in common value
auctions might just act “as if” they have cursed beliefs, since they observed seemingly cursed
behavior in a context where belief-based models had few explanatory power.
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subjects sometimes improved and sometimes worsened their bids.
Worsened: Fewer bids in the Nash range in stage II compared to stage I. Too few
bids in the Nash range in stage II to be qualified as sophisticated. I.e., these subjects
were worse-off after receiving information.
Ignorant: Same number of bids in Nash range in stage I and II, and there are no
switches between Nash and unsophisticated range across the stages. Too few bids in
the Nash range in stage I to be qualified as sophisticated. I.e., these subjects mostly
used unsophisticated bids in stage I and did not change their behavior.
Bidder type Treatment
NOINF INF
Sophisticated 1 1
Improved 8 14
Balanced 0 4
Worsened 9 17
Ignorant 15 3
Total 33 39
Table 2.6: Number of different bidding types across treatments
Table 2.6 reports the number of subjects in each class for both treatments. As
we can see, there are many subjects who either improved or worsened their bids
in stage II in treatment INF (31 out of 39). In the control group NOINF a large
fraction of subjects used unsophisticated bids from the beginning on and did not
change their bids in stage II. This is consistent with the finding that especially the
subjects in treatment INF changed their bids. In the next step, I check how the
different bidder types performed for different signals.
Figure 2.8: Bids in Nash range by bidder type
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Figure 2.8 reports the average number of bids in the Nash range in stage I and
II of all bidder types for low and high signals (only treatment INF). We can see that
those subjects in the Improved class, benefited mostly from changing their bids for
high signals, i.e., by increasing bids which were too low ex ante. On the other hand,
those subjects in the Worsened class, incurred the most harm for low signals, i.e.,
by increasing bids above the optimal level.
This illustrates a potential dilemma: by choosing low bids in stage I, which are
potentially in the Nash range, the probability of receiving the information LOWER
increases. As we can see, those subjects in theWorsened class are the second highest
performers in stage I, after the sophisticated ones (at least for low signals). However,
after receiving the message LOWER, subjects have a strong tendency of increasing
their bids, as already shown in Section 2.4.4. This leads to the conclusion that
choosing moderate bids in stage I can be harmful, when subjects are tempted to
increase their bids after losing an auction without differentiating between low and
high signals.
2.5 Discussion
This chapter investigates whether subjects in a common value auction perform better
when they already learn ex ante, before the final payoffs are known, whether their
bid is the winning bid or not - an information bidders in a sealed bid auction usually
receive only at the very end of the auction.
First, the overall results show that the majority of subjects indeed reacted on
the respective information they received and changed their bids in stage II. From
a theoretical point of view this is surprising, since we have to assume that a bid,
which was chosen in stage I, was considered as optimal in this context. So in the
framework of a second-price auction, there would be no need to change such a bid
in stage II, even when learning whether this bid is the winning bid or not. In other
words, if a bid was chosen conditional on winning in stage I, there would be no need
to change it in stage II.
Second, we have seen that at least in some constellations (lsH and hsL), the
subjects profited from the information they received. In other constellations, how-
ever, this effect is reverse and, overall, there is no difference between the subjects
in treatment INF and NOINF when we look at average profits. Therefore, addi-
tional information can be even negative for the bidders.35 A crucial problem is that
35In related studies like Charness and Levin (2009) and Koch and Penczynski (2018), the op-
timal behavior was mainly given by choosing a bid as low as possible. In my design, the bidders
have to differentiate between low and high signals, and decreasing a bid is not always optimal.
This additional hurdle shows that more information can be negative for the bidders when they
differentiate only imperfectly between situations in which decreasing (increasing) a bid is rational
and those in which it is not.
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subjects still often used simple heuristics instead of making strategic choices after
receiving feedback about their bid. On an individual level there is evidence that
bidders who choose moderate bids in stage I, face some kind of a ‘curse’, since the
probability of receiving the message LOWER is higher for them. This in turn leads
to a more frequent occurrence of the winner’s curse in stage II.
Finally, there is evidence in the data that at least for the information HIGHER,
the changing of bids is not just a rule of thumb, but it rather occurs due to Bayesian
updating since there is a much higher decreasing rate for low signals than for high
signals. This claim is also supported by the pattern that, for low signals, after
receiving the information HIGHER, most of the newly selected bids are below 20.
This suggests that the bidders, who won with a low signal, indeed realized that the
other bidder has most likely also a low signal.
As a concluding remark, there is to say that mistakes in hypothetical thinking
seem to explain a substantial part of irrational bidding behavior in common value
auctions. However, even without the necessity of conditioning on winning, there still
exists a significant deviation from optimal behavior which remains unexplained.
In the next chapter, I will investigate the presence and the consequences of an-
other cognitive bias, known as correlation neglect, in voting decisions. Contrary to
mistakes in hypothetical thinking, I will show in the following chapter that mistakes
due to correlation neglect might lead to more efficient outcomes in some environ-
ments.
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3 Correlation neglect and voting36
In many voting decisions people have to weigh their subjective preferences about the
alternatives against objective information they receive. This assessment is aggra-
vated since the latter may be subject to a double-counting problematic when people
treat correlated information sources as independent. This thesis is the first to test
the phenomenon of correlation neglect as a potentially welfare-enhancing bias in a
collective voting decision empirically. The results of my online experiment suggest
that (i) information aggregation is improved by this cognitive bias, (ii) the results
vary substantially with the risk-attitude of the subjects, and (iii) correlation neglect
is present in an environment with perfectly correlated signals and very high salience
of the correlation.
Two highly preference-driven elections on globally relevant outcomes dominated
the media coverage over the past years. In the Brexit referendum, voters had ideo-
logical preferences concerning “leave” or “remain”, but at the same time they also
received information about the overall pros and cons of each of the options, such
as the economic consequences, for example through the media. Similarly, Donald
Trump’s presidential campaign “Make America Great Again” served patriotic pref-
erences of the voters who had to weigh them against public evaluations of the protec-
tionist policies. In both cases a huge of information sources was constantly available.
At the same it was nearly impossible to identify common origins of seemingly in-
dependent news. This made the voters prone to overestimating the informational
content.
Correlation neglect refers to underestimating the degree to which various sources
of information may be correlated. Typical examples in the literature are the news
media or markets for financial assets (see, for example, Ortoleva and Snowberg, 2015;
Eyster and Weizsa¨cker, 2016; Enke and Zimmermann, 2017).37 There is an emerging
empirical evidence that individuals are prone to this cognitive bias when making de-
cisions in environments where they receive information from various sources which
might be correlated. This in turn can lead to highly biased beliefs and inefficient eco-
nomic outcomes, as for example shown by the experiments of Eyster and Weizsa¨cker
(2016) and Enke and Zimmermann (2017).
However, in a theoretical paper, Levy and Razin (2015a) argued that correlation
neglect might have positive effects on the outcome of collective decision problems,
like an election, due to improved information aggregation. So for example, in the
presence of correlation neglect, individuals who participate in a collective decision
36This chapter is a slightly modified version of Moser and Wallmeier (2019).
37For further evidence on correlation neglect consider, for example, Levy and Razin (2015b),
Eyster, Rabin, and Weizsa¨cker (2015), Ellis and Piccione (2017), Levy, Moreno de Barreda, and
Razin (2018), and Hossain and Okui (2018).
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might focus more on their available information from various sources and less on
their ideological preferences. This can lead to more efficient outcomes, even if the
various sources of information are not independent. So an important point, when
evaluating the effects of correlation neglect on economic outcomes, seems to be the
distinction between individual and collective decisions.
I provide an experimental design, where subjects can either vote for a safe pay-
ment or for a risky lottery with the same expected payoff. Hence, the choice for one
of the options depends on their risk preferences. Additionally, the subjects receive a
bonus for matching an unknown state of the world and a penalty for matching the
wrong state, respectively. In my setup the correct state of the world is either a “safe”
or a “risky” state. From this perspective my setup is very similar to the theoretical
model of Levy and Razin (2015a), where voters have (i) ideological preferences on
a left-right spectrum and, additionally, (ii) they receive an imperfect signal about
an unknown state of the world which is either left or right. In my setup, subjects
receive either a single signal, two perfectly correlated signals, or two independent
signals, which provide information about the unknown state of the world. When the
voter’s preference and the signal(s) are not aligned, she faces a non-trivial decision
problem.
I test the presence of correlation neglect in a between-subject design by com-
paring the share of voters that follow the signal contrary to their preferences in
the treatments with a single signal and two perfectly correlated signals. In both
cases the signal transmits the identical informational content such that differences
may be only attributed to correlation neglect. In addition, I also estimate the mag-
nitude of the bias by comparing the treatments with two perfectly correlated and
two independent signals. The latter presents the case where individuals update the
informational content rightfully which serves as the upper bound for correlation
neglect.
My overall findings suggest that correlation neglect is also present in environ-
ments where groups face a collective decision problem. Subjects who received per-
fectly correlated information followed more often this information compared to sub-
jects who only received one signal, even though the correlation of signals was clearly
recognizable and no calculations were required. Still, I observe a slight difference be-
tween the treatment where subjects received two correlated and the one where they
received two independent signals as the fraction of subjects following their signals
is highest with independent signals.
To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the first one that investigates the effect
of correlation neglect experimentally in a collective decision problem. In contrast to
other experimental studies, I include two dimensions in the maximization problem
of the subjects. One the one hand, individuals have preferences about one of two
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options and, on the other hand, they also receive a payoff for matching a specific
state of the world. Hence, subjects are not only paid for estimating a certain state
of the world exactly as possible, but they also receive an utility from their private
preferences which can potentially deviate from the state of the world.
The theoretical basis of this work is the paper by Levy and Razin (2015a).
However, the aim of my thesis is not to provide a direct theory testing of their model.
Instead, I want to create an environment that includes their main features, since their
voting context resembles scenarios of general interest (e.g., Brexit referendum, 2016
United States presidential election) which have not been conclusively investigated
in the experimental literature so far. In contrast to Levy and Razin (2015a), I do
not have a continuum of voters. Hence, each voter in my experiment is pivotal
with a non-zero probability. Implications resulting from this issue will be discussed
in Section 3.2. A further difference is that in my setup there can be individuals
with extreme preferences who would not vote for the state of the world even for the
hypothetical case where the state is perfectly observable. This in not the case in
Levy and Razin (2015a) where all individuals prefer to implement the state of the
world if the state would be perfectly observable. Additionally, I do not assume any
specific utility function, but focus on a revealed preferences approach instead.
3.1 Experimental design
3.1.1 General setting
In the case of real world elections one can think of numerous preferences which
may influence the voting decision and may or may not be aligned with the socially
efficient choice. An example are environmental preferences that would be in favor
of or against a change to renewable energy. While a voter may have preferences on
this topic in general, it is not clear which policy is the efficient alternative for the
society at the moment. People have to rely, for example, on estimates about the
consequences of fossil fuels for the climate and the costs of the change.
For my experiment, I have two requirements for the application. I need an envi-
ronment where individuals have preferences which are sufficiently easy to measure
and which can be incentivized. Since I have a second dimension, social efficiency,
which should influence the vote, I also need an immediate consequence from the
vote on the society.
For this purpose, I focused on an approach with risk preferences, since an at-
tempt of measuring political preferences with monetary incentives can lead to highly
inaccurate results. The advantage of risk preferences is that we have a sufficiently
high variation between individuals which are easy to measure in an online experi-
ment. In addition, the choice of a more (less) risky payment scheme can be directly
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implemented by generating a payoff for the group. Using risk preferences makes the
voting task more abstract, but at the same time clear statements can be made about
the effect of correlation neglect, when subjects are affected by personal preferences
- which refers to my main research question.
The experiment is divided into two parts. For each subject, one of the parts is
randomly chosen to be the payoff-relevant part. In part 1, subjects have to make a
choice for either a safe payment or a risky lottery with the same expected payoffs.
Hence, the purpose of part 1 is to elicit the risk preferences of the subjects using
an approach relying on revealed preferences. In part 2, subjects have to make the
same choice between a safe and a risky option, but now they receive an additional
payoff for matching a specific state of the world. To measure the prevalence and
the magnitude of correlation neglect in part 2, the participants either received one
signal (treatment OneSignal), two perfectly correlated signals (treatment TwoCorr),
or two independent signals (treatment TwoInd) which gave an imperfect hint about
a state of the world. Each subject only participated in of the treatments (between-
subject design). Detailed instructions can be found in Appendix F.
3.1.2 Part 1
In part 1, subjects are randomly allocated in groups of five people. The task of a
group is to implement a payment scheme W , with W ∈ {S,R}, by a majority vote
(i.e., if at least three people vote for the same payment scheme, this option will be
implemented). S generates a safe payment of 1 GBP for each group member and
R is a risky lottery that generates 0.25 GBP with 90% probability and 7.75 GBP
with 10% probability - which will be drawn individually and independently for each
group member. Both payment schemes, S and R, have the same expected value
of 1 GBP. Since this may not be obvious to the participants, I included a control
question before the vote where they had to indicate if one of the alternatives yield a
higher expected payoff than the other.38 In this way, I am able to obtain information
on the understanding of the mechanisms and to bring all participants to the same
level.
Majority decision Total payoff
S 1.00
R
0.25 (90%)
7.75 (10%)
Table 3.1: Payoff structure in part 1
38To facilitate an intuitive understanding of the question, I did not ask for the expected pay-
off which requires calculations. Instead, I asked if they expect to earn more by sticking to one
alternative or the other if they would participate 100 times in this game.
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The individuals make their voting decision in private. The purpose of part 1, is to
elicit the individual preferences of each subject about the two schemes. Individuals
voting for S have preference pS and individuals voting for R have preference pR.
3.1.3 Part 2 (Treatments)
In part 2, the groups again face a voting decision. The basic setup is like in part
1, but now the groups also have an unknown group state G, with G ∈ {s, r}, and
P (s) = P (r) = 0.5. If the group implements S (R) and the state of the group is s
(r), each group member earns an additional bonus of 0.25 GBP. If the group does
not match the state, each group member pays a penalty of 0.25 GBP. The base
payoff of both options, S and R, is the same as before. Each group participates in
one of the treatments OneSignal, TwoCorr, or TwoInd.
OneSignal The subjects are not aware of the group state, but each subject receives
an iid signal, σs or σr, about the state of the group. The signal is correct in two out
of three times, hence, we have P (s|σs) = P (r|σr) =
2
3
. After receiving their signal,
the subjects are asked to submit a vote for either S or R.
TwoCorr Same as in OneSignal, but now the subjects receive two signals which
are perfectly correlated. So either they receive (σ1s , σ
2
s) or (σ
1
r , σ
2
r). The available
information from the signals is the same as in OneSignal, however, subjects suffering
from correlation neglect might interpret the two signals as independent draws.
TwoInd Same as in OneSignal, but now the subjects receive two signals from two
independent draws. So either they receive (σ1s , σ
2
s), (σ
1
r , σ
2
r), (σ
1
s , σ
2
r), or (σ
1
r , σ
2
s).
Here we have P (s|σ1s , σ
2
s) = P (r|σ
1
r , σ
2
r) =
4
5
and P (r|σ1s , σ
2
r) = P (r|σ
1
r , σ
2
s) =
1
2
(a
formal proof can be found in Appendix E).
The payoff structure, which is the same in all treatments, is summarized in Table
3.2.
3.1.4 Post-experimental questionnaire
After part 2, the subjects were asked to answer a short post-experimental ques-
tionnaire. This involved self-reported risk preferences and two questions about the
mechanisms of the game.
For the self-reported risk preferences, I used the approach of Falk, Becker,
Dohmen, Huffman, and Sunde (2016), where subjects could indicate their willing-
ness to take risks on scale from 0 to 10, with a 0 meaning “completely unwilling to
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Majority decision Group state Base payoff Bonus/Penalty Total payoff
S s 1.00 0.25 1.25
S r 1.00 −0.25 0.75
R r
0.25 (90%)
0.25
0.50 (90%)
7.75 (10%) 8.00 (10%)
R s
0.25 (90%)
−0.25
0.00 (90%)
7.75 (10%) 7.50 (10%)
Table 3.2: Payoff structure in part 2
take risks” and a 10 meaning “very willing to take risks”. Eliciting the risk prefer-
ences in this way, additional to the vote in part 1, has two advantages. First, I can
deduce from the correlation of the vote for a risky payment and the self-reported
risk whether the participants understood the mechanism and actual risk preferences
influence the decision in my setting. Second, I have a measure that offers a larger
variation in the preferences compared to the binary choice. This additional infor-
mation is helpful to identify the role of the size of the risk preferences. For example,
if an individual is extremely risk-loving, then even if she is prone to correlation
neglect, a signal suggesting a bonus for implementing the safe alternative may not
be sufficient to make her switch to “safe”. Conversely, if she was leaning towards a
risky option only moderately, the signal may be sufficient for her to vote for “safe”.
Therefore, relying only on the chosen option in part 1 maybe too imprecise.
3.1.5 Implementation
Framing For my research question, I need preferences to be as clearly identifiable
as possible. Therefore, I chose not to use any context-specific framing. Although this
could be helpful to increase the understanding of the instructions (see, for example,
Alekseev, Charness, and Gneezy, 2017), it has the potential downside that I measure
a mixture of preferences. For example, I could use a hypothetical real world context,
say a choice between two environmental policies - one with a risky outcome and one
with a safe outcome. In that case the participant may have an idea what is the more
beneficial strategy in the real-world. This could (i) be not aligned with her general
risk preferences and (ii) might lead her to neglect the identical expected profit in
this experiment.
Also, I aimed at reducing the experimenter demand effect that could arise from
using the terms “safe” and “risky”. Therefore, I chose to name the alternatives
“YELLOW” and “PURPLE”, while the states of the world are “yellow” and “pur-
ple”, respectively (see also Appendix G).
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Calibration I have three calibration choices to make for this experiment. The
first is the spread of the risky payment. I aimed for a spread that roughly splits the
sample in half. If the spread is too close to the safe option, I might observe a large
share of individuals who choose the risky option although they consider themselves
as rather risk-averse. Alternatively, if the spread is too steep, the opposite may be
the case where even risk-loving persons still prefer the safe option.
The second choice concerns the size of the bonus (penalty), i.e., the strength of
the incentive to follow the signal. If the bonus (penalty) is too high, it dominates
the preferences of the electorate such that nobody would vote against their signal.
In that case, correlation neglect would not show up in the behavior since everybody
votes according to the signal for any informational content. On the other hand, an
incentive which is too low would lead voters to ignore the signal and to just rely on
their preferences. I used two pilot sessions to calibrate the parameters concerning
the risk spread and the size of the bonus.
Third, I need to choose the spread of signal strength for the cases when receiving
one signal and two independent signals, respectively. The relatively narrow range
between 66.67% and 80% is driven by the simple and intuitive mechanism I used to
provide the individuals with the signals.
Control questions I used control questions during the instructions to keep track
of the individuals’ understanding of the mechanisms. To get a precise estimate of
the understanding, (i) I made the answers optional, (ii) I provided at least three
answer alternatives, and (iii) I always set the default to “no answer” to reduce the
likelihood of randomly correct answers. Instead of employing an iterative mechanism
that allows the participant only to proceed once she answered correctly, I provided
a detailed answer page that explained the correct solution. While the first alterna-
tive could be solved by trying all options randomly, the latter aims at bringing all
participants to the same level of understanding.
Procedural details The experiment was programmed in LimeSurvey and con-
ducted on the research platform Prolific. Overall, I had 600 participants. 200 of the
subjects participated in treatment OneSignal, 200 of them in treatment TwoCorr,
and 200 participated in treatment TwoInd. The average completion time was ap-
proximately 10 minutes and the subjects earned, on average, 2 GBP including a
participation fee of 1 GBP.
3.2 Properties of the game
In this section, I will provide propositions about the properties of underlying game.
This includes considerations about the optimal behavior in the voting game, the
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effect of information aggregation, and assumptions concerning pivotality.
Proposition 6. Given that the group state G would be known, it is always optimal
to implement the respective group state, under the assumption of risk-neutrality.
The proof of Proposition 6 is straightforward and, hence, omitted. To see that
matching the state of the world is optimal, the expected values of the total payoffs
in Table 3.2 can be compared. Subjects voting according to their preference pW and
against the signal σG can do this for two reasons: (i) the preference for one of the
options is so strong, such that the individual still prefers the initial option chosen in
part 1 - even if the signal would be perfect; (ii) the belief in the signal is not large
enough, such that the individual prefers to stick with his initial vote in part 1.
With my design, I cannot disentangle between the motives (i) and (ii). However,
the fraction of subjects who vote against the signal for reason (i) should, on average,
be identical across the treatments since the choice of these subjects is not affected
by any signals. What I am interested in is the fraction of subjects who deviate
from their signal because of reason (ii) across the treatments to measure the effect
of correlation neglect.
Given that the subjects do not suffer from any correlation neglect, there should
be no statistical difference between OneSignal and TwoCorr, because the received
information is the same in both cases. Only in the case of correlation neglect we
should observe a significant difference. I am also able to measure the magnitude
of correlation neglect. Under the assumption of full correlation neglect for all sub-
jects, there should be no difference between the treatments TwoCorr and TwoInd.
However, if only some subjects are affected by correlation neglect, the fraction of
subjects, who stick to their preference and vote against the signals in TwoCorr,
should be larger compared to TwoInd, but still smaller than in OneSignal.
Proposition 7. In a group of five members, where every member receives an iid
signal σG with P (G|σG) =
2
3
, and every member votes according to her signal, the
state of the group G will be matched with ∼79% probability, when the group state is
implemented with simple majority.
The proof of Proposition 7 is provided in Appendix E. Groups where individuals
receive imperfect - but independent - signals are more likely to match a given state
of the world via a majority vote than a single individual who receives only one signal
of the same quality. This is due to effect of information aggregation which is also
mentioned in Levy and Razin (2015a). A group of five can increase the probability
of matching the state of the world from 66.67% to around 79%, when all group
members vote according to their signal.
As indicated in the beginning of this chapter, my voters are pivotal with non-
zero probability in contrast to Levy and Razin (2015a). However, in my setup being
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pivotal does not provide further information about the state of the world under some
mild assumptions which are stated below. Hence, the voters in my experiment can
opt for one option or the other independently of the behavior of the other group
members. This is summarized in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. Conditional on being pivotal, the probability for one state or the
other does not change, given that all other group members (i) vote according to their
signal or (ii) vote according to their preference.
The proof of Proposition 8 is provided in Appendix E. When conditions (i) or
(ii) are violated, cases might exist where being pivotal is informative. Consider for
example an individual who has preference pS and believes that most of the other
group members also have the same preference. If this individual further believes that
some, but not all, of the other players with preference pS would vote for S even when
the signal is σR, being pivotal can now indicate that most of the other group members
received a signal σR and, hence, that state r is more likely. Because if the state
would have been s, most of the players would have received a signal σS, and those
with preference pS will definitely vote for S. Hence, being pivotal is more unlikely
in this scenario. However, even under such conditions, there are no differences
between the treatments, unless the subjects have specific beliefs concerning the
presence of correlation neglect of the other group members. This in turn would imply
that the subjects are sufficiently sophisticated and able to recognize the problem of
correlation neglect. For these reasons, I assume in my analysis that any differences
between treatment OneSignal and TwoCorr cannot be explained by considerations
regarding pivotality.
3.3 Results
In this section, the results of the experiment are presented. First, I report the ex ante
preferences of all subjects before the treatment intervention. Second, I will exhibit
behavioral patterns in my data which indicate that a substantial fraction of the
subjects in my setup are prone to correlation neglect, treating perfectly correlated
signals as independent draws. Here, I will also provide a subgroup analysis by
distinguishing between the subjects with preference pS and those with preference
pR. As I will show, there is quite a heterogeneity between these types, since those
with preference pS vote considerably more often according to their received signal(s)
compared to those with preference pR. However, the degree of correlation neglect is
similar for both groups. Here, I also looked at the relationship between self-reported
risk preferences and the preferences elicitated in part 1 of the experiment. Finally,
I will provide some additional analysis for those subjects in treatment TwoInd who
receive mixed signals (i.e., either (σ1s , σ
2
r) or (σ
1
r , σ
2
s)). Overall, I observe patterns
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of correlation neglect in my data, however, I am not able to find strong statistical
evidence for this issue.
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Figure 3.1: Preferences across treatments
Figure 3.1 reports the preferences of the subjects across treatments. Overall, I
can observe that the preferences for S and R are quite balanced among the subjects
with a slightly more frequent appearance of preference S. Between the treatments
there is no significant difference in ex ante preferences (Fisher’s exact test, pairwise:
OS vs. TC, OS vs. TI, TC vs. TI). Comparing these results to the self-reported
risk preferences offers two insights. First, the mean values across treatments (5.40
for OneSignal, 5.26 for TwoCorr, and 5.24 for TwoInd) show also moderate risk
attitudes and they are consistent with the votes in part 1. The mean risk attitude
for the subjects with preference pS is 4.75 and the mean risk attitude for the subjects
with preference pR is 5.96 (p = 0.000, two-sample t-test). Second, a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test reports no significant difference between the respective distributions.
This means potential treatment differences are not driven by imbalanced subject
groups with respect to the shape of the risk preferences.
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Figure 3.2: Voted against signal when signal is different to preference
Figure 3.2 reports the share of subjects who voted against their signal and ac-
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cording to their preference, split up by treatment. Consequently, I restricted my
sample to those subjects whose signal σG (or signals (σ
1
G, σ
2
G)) and preference p
W
were different. In treatment TwoInd, I further restricted my attention to the cases,
where the subjects received the same two signals, i.e., either (σ1s , σ
2
s) or (σ
1
r , σ
2
r), to
make the results comparable. As a consequence, the number of applicable obser-
vations for my analysis is reduced to 98 in OneSignal, 97 in TwoCorr, and 57 in
TwoInd.
In Figure 3.2, we see that in the case of only one signal, approximately 33% of
the subjects vote against their signal and in favor of their preference. In the case
of two perfectly correlated signals, this rate decreases to 24%. When receiving two
independent signals the rate goes further down to 21%. The differences between the
treatments, although pointing into the right direction, are not statistically different
(based on a significance level of 5%) when using a 1-sided Fisher’s exact test (OS
vs. TC, p-value: 0.110; OS vs. TI, p-value: 0.086; TC vs. TI, p-value: 0.432).
In conclusion, I can say that I am not able to report a statistical treatment effect
based on a significance level of 5%. I observe patterns of correlation neglect in my
data, however, further empirical evidence would be needed to speak of a clear effect.
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Figure 3.3: Votes by treatment when signal is different to preference
Figure 3.3 reports the share of subjects who voted against their signal and ac-
cording to their preference, split up by preference and treatment. Here we can
observe a substantial heterogeneity between the subjects with preferences pR and
pS, respectively. Subjects with preference pR vote considerably more often against
their signal compared to those with preference pS. In the case of one signal, 25%
of the subjects, with a preference for the safe payment scheme S, vote against their
signal. In the group of those with a preference for the risky payment scheme R, 45%
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vote against their signal. Overall, we can observe that for both preferences, pS and
pR, the rate of voting against the signal decreases when subjects receive two per-
fectly correlated signals instead of one single signal (to 15% when having preference
pS and to 35% when having preference pR). In the case of two independent signals,
this rate goes further down to 12% when having preference pS, and to 32% when
having preference pR.
Here again, the differences between the treatments are not statistically significant
when using a 1-sided Fisher’s exact test (Preference RISKY, OS vs. TC, p-value:
0.249; Preference RISKY, OS vs. TI, p-value: 0.228; Preference RISKY, TC vs. TI,
p-value: 0.512; Preference SAFE, OS vs. TC, p-value: 0.131; Preference SAFE, OS
vs. TI, p-value: 0.126; Preference SAFE, TC vs. TI, p-value: 0.517).
To get a deeper insight about the effect of risk preferences on the choice on
one of the options, I also looked at the mean values of self-reported risk attitudes
split up by preference and voting decision (see Table 3.3). The overall pattern
is consistent with my previous findings. In general, the subjects with preference
pS report, on average, a more risk-averse attitude compared to the subjects with
preference pR. Furthermore, we see that subjects who deviate from their preference
and vote according to their signal(s) are (i) relatively more risk-loving in case of
preference pS (4.19 vs. 5.00; p = 0.056, two-sample t-test) and (ii) relatively more
risk-averse in case of preference pR, respectively (6.30 vs. 5.65; p = 0.097, two-
sample t-test). This strengthens my claim that the choice for one option or the
other is actually affected by the risk preferences of the subjects and that subjects
with more extreme risk attitudes vote more often against their signal(s).
Risk preference Mean self-reported risk
Vote for preference Vote for signal(s) 6= preference
Preference SAFE 4.19 5.00
Preference RISKY 6.30 5.65
0 = completely unwilling to take risks, 10 = very willing to take risks
Table 3.3: Self-reported risk preferences
A remaining question is, whether correlation neglect can be actually beneficial in
my experimental setup. By construction of the game, groups where the individuals
vote more often according to the signal(s), generate, on average, higher earnings.
Hence, from the perspective of expected earnings it is beneficial for the subjects
when they overestimate the informational content of two perfectly correlated signals
and vote more often according to them. This leads to fewer cases of uniformed
voting and, as a result, the state of the world is matched more often. In this sense,
I have shown that, similar to Levy and Razin (2015a), it is possible to create an
environment where correlation neglect can have a welfare-enhancing effect.
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Figure 3.4: Votes by preference when signals are mixed
As a last step of my analysis, I look at those subjects in treatment TwoInd
who received mixed signals. While this is not directly related to my initial research
questions, I am interested at this point whether I observe the tendency that one of
the signals is more salient for the voters and, hence, has a stronger influence on their
voting decision. Figure 3.4 reports the fractions of subjects who voted for R or S
when receiving mixed signals in treatment TwoInd. I can observe the pattern that
most of the subjects stick with their preference, especially those with preference pR,
but when deviating, the first signal has a higher impact on their choice. Also here,
it should be noted that the differences are not statistically significant.
3.4 Discussion
I provided an experiment where individuals participated in a collective voting deci-
sion and faced a trade-off between personal preferences and matching a state of the
world. Subjects received either one signal, two perfectly correlated signals, or two
independent signals which gave an imperfect hint about the state of the world. I find
weak evidence that subjects are biased due to correlation neglect, even though the
voting problem is very simple and no sophisticated calculations are required. This
in turn leads to the pattern that subjects in TwoCorr match the state of the group
more often compared to those in OneSignal, which consequently leads to higher
earnings for the subjects in this group by the design of the game.
A general implication that correlation neglect is beneficial in elections with ma-
jority vote should, however, be taken with caution. The positive effect strongly
depends on the structure of the correlated signals. In my setup the number of cor-
related signals was identical for both states of the world and there were no asymme-
tries. A typical problem of correlated information in real-life scenarios is, however,
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that some sources of information are more numerous than other sources. For exam-
ple, before the Brexit referendum articles in newspapers supporting “Leave” were
more spread compared to articles supporting “Remain”.39 For a common voter it
is barely possible to observe the entire correlation structure of such news and to
calculate how much weight she should put on each of the articles. In this context,
a heuristic of simply following the most widely used newspapers is not necessarily
optimal.
Overall, I can confirm the findings of related studies concerning correlation ne-
glect, by showing that this cognitive bias is very robust and does also occur in
environments where the correlation of signals is presented in an obvious way. Since
I do only find weak evidence for my claims, further research might be necessary to
fully confirm the patterns I observed.
In the next chapter, I will deviate from the topic of cognitive biases and heuris-
tics and, instead, I will present research concerning leadership and preferences for
cooperation within the framework of a dynamic public goods game. Hence, I leave
the area of non-standard beliefs and focus on non-standard preferences now.
39UK newspapers’ positions on Brexit (2016, May 23). Retrieved May 12, 2019, from
http://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2016-05-23-uk-newspapers-positions-brexit
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4 Leadership in dynamic public goods games40
Are leaders important for the progress of societies? Jones and Olken (2005) find
evidence for this claim regarding national leaders and show that they are an impor-
tant determinant for economic growth. In general, economic growth in developed
countries is often linked with cooperation processes, such as the development and
spread of new technologies and knowledge, which requires, in many cases, the joint
efforts of several actors. A key question here is whether leadership expressed through
“leading-by-example” (Hermalin, 1998) fosters stable cooperation in such partner-
ships. This is particularly relevant for current urgent problems, such as climate
change, and the countries’ joint activities concerning environmental protection.
In experimental economics, a common tool to analyze cooperation problems are
static public goods games (PG games henceforth). Most of the time, cooperation,
however, is not a one-time affair. Instead, stakeholders commonly interact many
times with each other and dynamic dependencies exist such that contributions in
former rounds have an impact on the public good supply in the current round.
Endowment carryover is an example for a dynamic dependency which generates
scope for endogenous growth and inequality. In such an environment, it is possible
for individuals to reinvest cooperation profits from the previous period into further
cooperation. For example, public infrastructure can ensure that higher profits are
made and those profits, as a consequence, can be reinvested. A similar pattern holds
for companies’ R&D investments or, in a broader context, the evolution of societies
(Ga¨chter, Mengel, Tsakas, and Vostroknutov, 2017).
I am interested whether leading-by-example yields an amelioration in public good
supply considering such a dynamic environment with endowment carryover. In my
setup, leading-by-example means that a group member decides first and the other
group members can observe his or her decision right before they make their own deci-
sion. Hence, the leader has the opportunity to precede by setting a (good) example.
I use a plain setting with a random subject being determined as a leader (exogenous
leadership). The implementation that is probably most close to mine is that of Gu¨th,
Levati, Sutter, and Van Der Heijden (2007). In their “fixed treatment”, one of four
group members is randomly selected to be the leader and remains in that position.
This exogenous procedure offers a simple and clear-cut treatment.41 I designed the
dynamic dependency in a way that is close to that of Ga¨chter, Mengel, Tsakas, and
Vostroknutov (2017), having the following features: (i) there is no consumption until
the last round, i.e., the entire wealth can be reinvested at the beginning of a new
40This chapter is a slightly modified version of Eichenseer and Moser (2019b).
41Furthermore, at least in a static game, there seems to be no differences with respect to con-
tributions between a fixed and a rotating leader (see Gu¨th, Levati, Sutter, and Van Der Heijden,
2007).
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round and (ii) endogenous endowments are determined by previous contributions.
As a result, this variant of a public goods game allows for both, endogenous growth
and endogenous inequality.
With my experiment, I contribute both to the literature on leadership in public
goods experiments (see Eichenseer, 2019, for a review) and the literature on dynamic
public goods games (e.g., Sadrieh and Verbon, 2006; Battaglini, Nunnari, and Pal-
frey, 2016; Rockenbach andWolff, 2017; Ga¨chter, Mengel, Tsakas, and Vostroknutov,
2017). My results indicate that a positive effect of leading-by-example is present in
a dynamic setting with endowment carryover. Moreover, the presence of a leader
also significantly reduces the within group inequality. Regarding the literature on
leadership in public goods games, I provide a further contribution by establishing a
link between behavioral types of the leader and leadership success, which comple-
ments existing research (e.g., Ga¨chter, Nosenzo, Renner, and Sefton, 2012). Using
a sequential prisoner’s dilemma for classification (Kosfeld, 2019; Eichenseer and
Moser, 2019a), I show that an important predictor for the success of a group is the
behavioral type of the leader.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 offers a brief
review of the related literature followed by Section 4.2 which describes the experi-
mental design. Section 4.3 gives an overview on hypotheses and research questions
whereas Section 4.4 presents and discusses the results of the experiment. Section
4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.1 Literature review
Many (textbook) examples of public goods have in common that they take years to
accumulate and provide streams of benefits in the long run, however, at the same
time, they also require consecutive expenditures either to improve or to maintain
their levels (Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey, 2016). Consequently, it is important
to know whether major results of static public goods also hold for dynamic variants,
which are often closer to reality. In experimental economics, an emerging literature
has attempted to fill this gap in the past years. Sadrieh and Verbon (2006) analyze
a setting where social output today determines production possibilities tomorrow
(endowment carryover), and social output is distributed unequally. Noussair and
Soo (2008) study a dynamic public goods game with a MPCR (marginal per capita
return) carryover: the return on contributions is a function of decisions in previous
periods. This characteristic leads to the effect that, in most cases, the usual pattern
of declining contributions over time does not turn up. Cadigan, Wayland, Schmitt,
and Swope (2011) investigate whether subjects’ behavior in a PG game with a
stock level carryover comes close to the qualitative predictions of Markov Perfect
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Equilibria. Ga¨chter, Mengel, Tsakas, and Vostroknutov (2017) and Rockenbach and
Wolff (2017) both investigate the effects of punishment in a dynamic public goods
game with endowment carryover. While punishment in a static setting is usually
very successful, there are drawbacks in a dynamic setting. Punishment results in
fewer resources available for the punished ones, which could be invested in further
cooperation. In consequence, it reduces the potential for future cooperation gains
(Rockenbach and Wolff, 2017). To sum up, it is not obvious that standard recipes
to improve cooperation do really work well in a dynamic setting.
This question also holds for leading-by-example. To the best of my knowledge,
there exists no paper in the experimental literature that looks at the effect of lead-
ership in a dynamic public goods game. Restricting my attention to experiments
in which a leader is exogenously determined and does not enjoy formal power or
superior information, I can summarize previous results in static public goods games
as following: exogenous leadership significantly increases contributions to the public
good in Moxnes and Van der Heijden (2003), Gu¨th, Levati, Sutter, and Van Der Hei-
jden (2007), Levati, Sutter, and van der Heijden (2007), Pogrebna, Krantz, Schade,
and Keser (2011), Dannenberg (2015), and McCannon (2018) while insignificant ef-
fects are reported in Haigner and Wakolbinger (2010), Ga¨chter and Renner (2018),
Sahin, Eckel, and Komai (2015), and Gu¨rerk, Lauer, and Scheuermann (2018). A
significant negative effect is reported in Rivas and Sutter (2011). I can therefore
state that in the majority of cases, exogenous leadership yields an improvement in
public good contributions.42
Leaders who set a good example have a positive impact on followers. A common
observation from static PG experiments is that leaders’ and followers’ contribu-
tions are correlated to a large degree (see, for example, Arbak and Villeval, 2013).
In addition, leaders also greatly shape the expectations of the followers (Ga¨chter
and Renner, 2018). However, the literature also shows that followers systemati-
cally contribute less than leaders (see, for example, Gu¨th, Levati, Sutter, and Van
Der Heijden, 2007; Haigner and Wakolbinger, 2010; Rivas and Sutter, 2011; Arbak
and Villeval, 2013; Dannenberg, 2015; Cappelen, Reme, Sørensen, and Tungodden,
2016; Ga¨chter and Renner, 2018). As a result of this selfish-biased conditional coop-
eration (Neugebauer, Perote, Schmidt, and Loos, 2009), leaders are relatively worse
off giving rise to a ‘leader’s curse’ (Ga¨chter and Renner, 2018). Regarding the ques-
tion of who makes a good leader, Ga¨chter, Nosenzo, Renner, and Sefton (2012) try to
give an answer by classifying subjects in a one-shot strategy method setting. They
42Larger effects of leadership usually show up when it is endogenous (Rivas and Sutter, 2011;
Haigner and Wakolbinger, 2010), when the leader is endowed with formal power (Gu¨th, Levati,
Sutter, and Van Der Heijden, 2007; Levati, Sutter, and van der Heijden, 2007; Gu¨rerk, Irlenbusch,
and Rockenbach, 2009; Sutter and Rivas, 2014), or when the leader has an informational edge
(Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund, 2005; Levati, Sutter, and van der Heijden, 2007).
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elicit within-subject leader and (conditional) follower contributions as well as their
beliefs. The main finding is that subjects who would behave conditionally coopera-
tive as followers, give significantly more if they are leaders, even after controlling for
optimism. As a result, groups perform best when led by weak or strong conditional
cooperators in this strategy method setting.
4.2 Experimental design and procedures
My experiment consists of two parts. Part I, which is a sequential prisoner’s
dilemma, is the same for all subjects. I used this decision task to classify subjects’
cooperation types. In part II of the experiment, subjects performed a dynamic pub-
lic goods game which was either played simultaneously without leader (NOLEAD)
or sequentially with a leader who moved first (LEAD). I used a between-subject
design, hence, subjects either participated in NOLEAD or in LEAD.
4.2.1 Part I
Eliciting conditional cooperation types
Before entering one of the two main treatments (NOLEAD or LEAD), I elicit con-
ditional cooperation types of all subjects by a sequential prisoner’s dilemma.43 I
matched the subjects in groups of two people and both players are endowed with 1
Euro.
P1
P2
(2 e , 2 e)
S
(0 e , 3 e)
K
S
P2
(3 e , 0 e)
S
(1 e , 1 e)
K
K
Figure 4.1: Payoff structure of the sequential prisoner’s dilemma
First, Player 1 decides whether to send his Euro to Player 2 (choose action S ) or
keep the Euro for himself (choose action K ). After observing his choice, Player 2 can
43This method is used for example by Miettinen, Kosfeld, Fehr, and Weibull (2017) and described
in further detail in Kosfeld (2019) and Eichenseer and Moser (2019a).
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decide, conditionally on the choice of Player 1, whether to send 1 Euro (action S ) or
keep it (action K ). If the Euro is sent to the other player, it doubles. Therefore, a
social optimum is reached when both players send their Euro. However, maximizing
their own payoffs means that none of the two players send their Euro. Hence, the
decision situation of part I resembles a sequential prisoner’s dilemma. Figure 4.1
depicts the payoff structure of this game.
All subjects state their decisions for being either Player 1 or 2 (strategy method)
and they are randomly allocated to one of these roles at the end of the experiment
and paid accordingly. In addition, I asked them how many percent of participants
they consider to choose the cooperative action when Player 1 cooperates/defects
to elicit their beliefs about the other players’ behavior.44 The set of strategies,
Xi, in this game for Player 2 is given by Xi = {SS,KK, SK,KS}. Based on the
participants’ conditional second mover’s choice, I can classify subjects as altruists
(unconditional cooperators), conditional cooperators (cooperate only if the first-
mover cooperates), free-riders (never cooperate) andmismatchers (play the opposite
of the other player) as shown by Table 4.1.45 46
Cooperation type Behavior & Strategy
Conditional cooperator (CC) Cooperates only if the other player also cooperates; SK
Selfish (SF) Never cooperates (free-rider); KK
Altruist (AL) Always cooperates; SS
Mismatcher (MM) Does the opposite of the other player; KS
Table 4.1: Cooperation types
4.2.2 Part II
Simultaneous treatment (NOLEAD)
In the main part of my experiment, subjects play a dynamic public goods game in
one of two treatments (between-subject design), either NOLEAD or LEAD. The
earnings of a given round serve as the endowment for the next round.
Period 1 2 3 4
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Table 4.2: Structure of periods and rounds
44I did not incentivize this guessing task in order to keep cognitive load at a moderate level.
45In my experiment, I only had one subject which I classified as mismatcher. Since this subject
responded to cooperation with selfish behavior, I also classified it as a selfish type for my further
analysis.
46A balancing table, reporting the distribution of types across treatments, can be found in
Appendix H (see Table H.1).
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In both conditions, subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four people,
which stay the same for one period consisting of seven rounds. After each period,
subjects are randomly rematched. In total, the game is played for four periods (see
Table 4.2). In round 1 of every period, each participant i, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, is
endowed with E1i = 20 Taler (exchange rate 1 Euro = 10 Taler), which he can either
keep for himself in his “private account” or contribute to the public good labeled
as a “group account” (gi denotes the individual contribution to the group account).
The MPCR for the group account is 0.375 which means that the group account has
a return of 1.5.
Hence, the earnings at the end of round 1 are given by:
E2i = E
1
i − g
1
i +
1.5
4
4∑
j=1
g1j
which serve as the endowment in round 2. Consequently, the endowment for round
t is given by:
Eti = E
t−1
i − g
t−1
i +
1.5
4
4∑
j=1
gt−1j
and the final payoff of a period is given by the endowment after round 7, which is:
πi = E
7
i − g
7
i +
1.5
4
4∑
j=1
g7j .
In each round of a period, subjects simultaneously make their decisions without
knowledge of other participants’ contributions prior to taking their own contribu-
tion decision in NOLEAD. After each round, they are informed how many Taler
the other group members contributed individually and about their and the others’
new endowment. After finishing a period, subjects are randomly rematched to new
groups of four. One of the four periods is randomly chosen for payment (random
incentive mechanism).
Sequential treatment (LEAD)
Treatment LEAD is similar to treatment NOLEAD, except that one subject is ran-
domly allocated to the role of a leader at the beginning of a period. This participant
(leader) moves first in all rounds of a period. In each round, the other subjects (fol-
lowers) are informed about the leader’s contribution and subsequently decide simul-
taneously upon their own contributions. In every period a new leader is randomly
selected. Everything else is identical to NOLEAD.
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4.2.3 Participants and procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted in the Regensburg Economic Science Lab
(RESL) in February 2018 using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) for programming and
Orsee (Greiner, 2004) for recruitment. 92 participants (45 men and 47 women;
mean age: 23), most of them enrolled in business administration, economics, or a
related subject, took part in four experimental sessions with a minimum of 20 and
a maximum of 24 subjects per session. Before entering the lab, participants were
randomly assigned to a cabin with a computer. For both parts of the experiment,
I provided participants with written instructions as well as a verbal summary that
was read aloud (translated instructions are available in Appendix I). Subjects were
not aware of the content of part II of the experiment before finishing part I. I payed
participants in Euro in private at the end of the experiment. In total, the experiment
lasted about 75 minutes and generated average earnings of about 14.12 EUR per
subject (including a show-up fee of 4 EUR).47
4.3 Hypotheses and research questions
4.3.1 Wealth
Under the assumption of selfish, payoff-maximizing players, the unique equilibrium
of the simultaneous game, NOLEAD, is that all players contribute zero in each
round (consider the online appendix of Ga¨chter, Mengel, Tsakas, and Vostroknutov,
2017, for a formal proof). A simple backwards induction argument also renders zero
contributions in each round as the unique equilibrium of the sequential game LEAD
(hence, I abstain from providing a formal proof here). Therefore, zero contributions,
and thus, no difference in final payoffs should emerge in both treatments assuming
only selfish players.
However, in the presence of a substantial proportion of subjects whose patterns
of behavior can be described as reciprocal types that exhibit conditional cooperation
(Keser and Van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr, 2001), this does not
necessarily hold anymore. Ambrus and Pathak (2011) set up such a model and adopt
it to a static public goods game. Their main idea is that in an environment where
both selfish and reciprocal types exist, the selfish types can induce reciprocal types
to choose non-zero contributions. As conditional cooperators are backward-looking
in determining their contributions, selfish players can influence future contributions
of reciprocal players positively by contributing a large amount. The more rounds
that are left, the higher the influence of these contributions. It is therefore in
the interest of selfish players to contribute, especially in early rounds of a period,
47In part I of the experiment, payoffs were given in EUR. For part II, I used Taler as experimental
currency unit (ECU) with an exchange rate of 1 Euro = 10 Taler.
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as this causes a positive reaction of the reciprocal players affecting the remaining
periods. In the course of a period, this incentive for selfish players diminishes,
which leads to a decreasing pattern of their contributions. The intuition behind this
mechanism is the assumption of selfish players who maximize their material payoffs
and of reciprocal players whose payoffs additionally depend on a concave reciprocity
function. The function itself is non-decreasing in other players’ contributions and
it is embedded in the payoff function of a reciprocal player. This payoff function
is maximal when a specific target contribution is reached - which depends on the
other players’ contributions and the reciprocity function. Additionally, there is the
assumption of no overreciprocation, which means that one unit of contribution by
any player does increase the value of the reciprocity function by not more than 1.
This in turn, leads to a decreasing marginal impact of contributions over the course
of the game.48 This driving force in the model of Ambrus and Pathak (2011) is also
reasonable in my dynamic setting with endowment carryover. In addition, higher
contributions by selfish players have a positive impact on contribution capabilities
of the reciprocal types, thus, constituting a second incentive for them to contribute
in early rounds.
The sources of a possible positive impact of leadership are twofold. First, due to
their exposition, the initial contribution of a leader offers a chance for amelioration:
it gives clues for everyone else about the distribution of types and the degree of
optimism the leader has over the occurrence of cooperation. Reciprocal types are
no longer solely dependent on their expectations about the contributions of others,
instead, the leader’s first contribution is setting a salient example. The leader acts
as a ‘belief manager’ (Ga¨chter and Renner, 2018). As early contributions determine
later contribution capabilities, the (positive) signal that the leader can give here
might have a big impact. Second and likewise, the leader can give a positive signal
inducing conditional cooperators to reciprocate in other periods by his particular
visibility. This is even true for the very last round of a given period: a selfish leader
has incentives to make a positive contribution in the last period, since reciprocal
types may respond to his contribution. In the simultaneous game this is not the
case, where selfish types should choose a contribution of zero in the last round.
Taken together, this gives rise to my first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Assuming a substantial fraction of conditional cooperators, I expect
non-negative contributions in both treatments. In addition, I expect that contribu-
tions in LEAD are larger than in NOLEAD, resulting in higher final earnings.
48Consider the appendix of Ambrus and Pathak (2011) for a formal proof.
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4.3.2 Inequality
As described in Section 4.1, followers typically contribute less than leaders. Follow-
ers adopt an imperfect matching strategy and donate systematically less compared
to the leaders, displaying signs of imperfect or selfish-biased conditional coopera-
tion. In my dynamic setting, this effect would intensify round by round, so that
the leader would be impoverished relative to the followers. Compared to NOLEAD,
larger inequality would be the result. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a. LEAD leads to higher average within group inequality compared
to NOLEAD.
An alternative view would insist that due to the leaders influence (Ga¨chter and
Renner, 2018), the followers may have a more homogeneous contribution pattern
than subjects in NOLEAD. Despite the discrepancy between a leader’s and his
followers’ contributions, this would give rise to reduced inequality compared to
NOLEAD which consequently yields the following alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b. LEAD leads to lower average within group inequality compared
to NOLEAD.
So in summary, I have two competing hypotheses. Accordingly, it is undecided to
me a priori whether leadership (LEAD) leads to an increase or decrease in inequality
within a group compared to NOLEAD.
4.3.3 Leader types
Similar to the one-shot-game scenario of Ga¨chter, Nosenzo, Renner, and Sefton
(2012), I also expect cooperative types to be the better leaders with respect to av-
erage final earnings of a group. Due to a kind of “false consensus effect” and their
social preferences, I expect them to make higher initial contributions. In addition,
I especially expect conditional cooperators to promote cooperation by giving the
group the right signals for cooperation. In the spirit of the model of Ambrus and
Pathak (2011), I expect strategic leadership of selfish types with a declining pattern
of their contributions.
Hypothesis 3. Within LEAD I expect that groups work best when led by coopera-
tively inclined individuals.
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4.4 Results
In this section, I present the results of my experiment. First, I focus on the effect
of leadership by comparing both treatments. This mainly involves answering the
question of whether leadership has an impact on the wealth of group members and
inequality within groups. For each of the two questions, I also consider the influence
of the behavioral type of the leader.
Furthermore, I want to know whether leadership reduces the number of individ-
uals that are likely to find themselves in a sucker position, not benefiting from any
cooperation gains. For this, I make use of a slightly modified version of the payoff
dominance criterion, which is used in game theory. According to my definition,
we have payoff dominance within a group and round as long as all group mem-
bers strictly improve their earnings at the end of a round compared to the previous
round, in absolute terms.49 More formally: there is payoff dominance at the end of
round t − 1, as long as Eti > E
t−1
i holds for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. A violation of this
pattern naturally occurs, when some members of the group contribute relatively few
money to the group pot, while others spend more (free-rider behavior), or when
all group members stop contributing money to the group pot. In my analysis, I
find that leadership leads to a delayed occurrence of the first violation of the payoff
dominance condition.
In the last part of the analysis, I focus on treatment LEAD only, to get a deeper
insight about the underlying mechanisms of successful leadership. My aim is to find
out whether the followers’ behavior is also dependent on their behavioral types, with
regard to their reaction on a leader’s contribution. Furthermore, it is my intention
to take a closer look at different leader types and to show why some of them are
more successful than others. In particular, I investigate whether I can observe the
predicted pattern of decreasing relative contributions of selfish leaders, and thus
strategic leadership behavior. I conclude with illustrative examples of successful
and less successful leadership.
Overall, my results suggest that leadership is an important driver for the success
of a group. Especially the behavior of the leader in the first round(s) is crucial for
the further course of the group. Additionally, I find that the cooperation type of the
leader matters a lot: groups led by cooperatively inclined types have, on average, a
significantly greater final endowment. The leader himself, however, is, on average,
not better off than the participants in the simultaneous treatment NOLEAD. So it
is mainly the followers who profit from leadership.
49In this sense, my definition of payoff dominance can also be seen as a stricter version of the
Pareto criterion, since I require a strict improvement of all players.
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4.4.1 Wealth
I start with the question of whether group members are better off in the end, when
they are in a group with a leader. Comparing final earnings of participants at the
end of round 7, I find a significant treatment effect (p=0.025, clustered two-sided
two-sample t-test). Participants in the sequential treatment LEAD earn, on average,
about 89 Taler compared to 65 Taler average earnings in NOLEAD at the end of
round 7 - which is an increase of around 37%. Figure 4.2 (left) depicts average
endowments at the end of each round by treatment.
Figure 4.2: Average endowment at the end of each round
Table 4.3 reports random-effects models, where I estimated the treatment effect
of LEAD on final earnings in different specifications (period controls are included in
all regression models). In this regression table, I used the information from part I of
the experiment, regarding the cooperation type of the leader, and I also investigated
the effect of a violation of the payoff dominance criterion already after round 1. It
becomes apparent that the leader’s cooperation type is essential (see also Figure 4.2
(right)). Leadership with a conditional cooperator as first-mover improves earnings
a lot (more than an altruist) while a selfish leader worsens the outcome (although
not significantly).50 I will discuss this in more detail in Section 4.4.4.
If there are no mutual benefits of cooperation in round 1, this has persistent
effects on final outcomes (see column (3) of Table 4.3). Subjects in groups, without
payoff dominance after round 1, suffer from large and negative effects on their final
earnings. The coordinating role of leadership is also reflected in the fact that the
presence of a leader delays the first violation of the payoff dominance condition, as I
will show in the further part of the analysis (see Section 4.4.3). This is an important
aspect which can explain why a leader can be valuable for the group.
50I used a Wald test for comparing the coefficients.
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Endowment (end of round 7)
(1) (2) (3)
LEAD 23.847∗∗ -10.780 -33.224∗∗∗
(10.511) (8.342) (6.712)
LEAD X CC leader 54.339∗∗∗ 57.315∗∗∗
(13.505) (12.562)
LEAD X AL leader 24.365∗∗ 23.365∗
(11.929) (13.159)
No PAYOFF DOMINANCE after R1 -65.028∗∗∗
(6.485)
Constant 60.439∗∗∗ 58.545∗∗∗ 103.191∗∗∗
(8.297) (8.406) (8.063)
Period controls YES YES YES
Observations 368 368 368
Subjects 92 92 92
R2 overall 0.024 0.075 0.217
Note: Random-effects regression with period controls. Cluster-robust standard errors
(on the subject-level) are in parentheses. Panel variable: subject ; time variable:
period. In columns (2) and (3) the variable “LEAD” can be interpreted as LEAD
treatment times a selfish leader.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 4.3: Regression Table - Final endowment
I have now investigated whether the presence of a leader has benefits for the final
wealth of the group members. In addition, we saw how the leader can already shape
the game in round 1. My results can be summarized as follows:
Observation 1. My findings suggest that leadership has a positive impact on final
wealth. In addition, the behavioral type of the leader has a major impact. The mem-
bers of groups led by a conditional cooperator are best off, on average. Furthermore,
if there are no mutual benefits of cooperation in round 1, this has persistent negative
effects on final outcomes.
4.4.2 Inequality
A question that naturally arises in connection with a dynamic public goods game
with endowment carryover is that of inequality. In my setting, inequality can endoge-
nously arise through different contributions of the group members to the public good.
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According to Hypothesis 2a, leaders suffer some kind of curse. Previous research,
concerning static public goods games, has shown that leaders earn, on average, less
than followers (see, for example, Gu¨th, Levati, Sutter, and Van Der Heijden, 2007).
They are, so to speak, exploited by the followers. This pattern should lead to rising
inequality. However, as reflected in Hypothesis 2b, previous research also states that
leaders have a great influence on the expectations and contributions of the followers
(see, for example, Ga¨chter and Renner, 2018). Thus, if a leader has a big impact
on the followers, it can be expected that the contributions to the public good will
become more even. More even followers’ contributions would result in less within-
group inequality. In the further course of this chapter, I will show that it is mainly
the second effect which predominates here.
Figure 4.3: Average Gini coefficient at the end of each round by treatment
A common measurement for inequality is the Gini index that I compute for
every group and round (a value of 0 refers to complete equality, whereas a value of 1
refers to complete inequality). I used a random-effects regression where a uniquely
identifiable group serves as panel variable and the round serves as time variable (see
Table 4.4). Figure 4.3 further illustrates my findings graphically, by plotting the
average Gini coefficient per round, split up by treatment. We see that the average
inequality in LEAD is lower compared to NOLEAD and, in general, I observe that
inequality rises with each round in both treatments of the dynamic public goods
game.
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GINI coefficient
(1) (2) (3)
LEAD -0.037∗∗∗ 0.003 0.011
(0.013) (0.018) (0.018)
LEAD X CC leader -0.058∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.019)
LEAD X AL leader -0.041 -0.040
(0.026) (0.026)
No PAYOFF DOMINANCE after R1 0.028∗∗
(0.013)
Constant 0.099∗∗∗ 0.100∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Period controls YES YES YES
Round controls YES YES YES
Observations 644 644 644
Groups 92 92 92
R2 overall 0.193 0.246 0.277
Note: Random-effects regression with period and round controls. Cluster-robust
standard errors (on the group-level) are in parentheses. Panel variable: group; time
variable: round. In columns (2) and (3) the variable “LEAD” can be interpreted
as LEAD treatment times a selfish leader.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 4.4: Regression Table - GINI coefficient
As shown by column (1) in Table 4.4, I can report a significant negative treatment
effect with respect to within group inequality. Again the leader’s type does matter
a lot. A conditional cooperator as a leader has a significant effect in reducing
inequality as measured by the Gini index, while the effect for other leader types is
insignificant (see column (2) in Table 4.4). I also see that groups that achieve no
payoff dominance in round 1, have a significantly higher inequality. I summarize as
follows:
Observation 2. Leadership has a positive impact on reducing inequality within
groups as measured by the Gini index. This effect is mainly driven by the condi-
tional cooperators. If there are no mutual benefits of cooperation in round 1, this
increases inequality significantly.
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4.4.3 Payoff dominance accross rounds
As we have seen in the previous parts, having at least one group member who
does not strictly improve his or her endowment already in round 1, has a persistent
effect, resulting in lower final earnings for all group members. In this section, I show
that leadership can be a useful tool in preventing an early violation of the payoff
dominance condition.
As Figure 4.4 indicates, I find evidence that leadership plays a pivotal role in
establishing stable cooperation for multiple rounds. In more than 60% of the cases
at least one individual does not strictly improve in NOLEAD after the first round.
By contrast, in LEAD only in around 30% of the cases the criterion for no payoff
dominance is met after the first round, highlighting the leader’s role in coordinating
others’ contributions. On average, at least one subject within a group does not
strictly improve for the first time after 2.75 rounds in NOLEAD, compared to 3.75
rounds in LEAD (p=0.0289, two-sided two-sample t-test). The sequential treatment
therefore delays the first violation, on average, by one round.
Figure 4.4: First emergence of no PAYOFF DOMINANCE
We can further see that in treatment NOLEAD, there is a second peak in round
6, whereas in LEAD this second peak occurs only in round 7. This indicates that
typical last round effects, driven by free-rider behavior, occur earlier in NOLEAD
compared to LEAD.
In Table 4.5 we can see that the sequential treatment LEAD has a significant
effect on deferring the first appearance of a situation where at least one subject of
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the group has no benefits from cooperation (the dependent variable is the round
in which at least one group member does not strictly improve for the first time).
Controlling for the type of the leader (column (2) of Table 4.5), I find that it is the
conditional cooperators that have a positive impact when selected to be leaders.
Round of first violation of PD
(1) (2)
LEAD 1.000∗∗∗ 0.186
(0.351) (0.384)
LEAD X CC leader 1.243∗∗∗
(0.388)
LEAD X AL leader 0.689∗
(0.405)
Constant 2.609∗∗∗ 2.571∗∗∗
(0.361) (0.360)
Period controls YES YES
Observations 368 368
Subjects 92 92
R2 overall 0.055 0.088
Note: Random-effects regression with period and round con-
trols. Cluster-robust standard errors (on the subject-level)
are in parentheses. Panel variable: subject ; time variable:
period. In column (2) the variable “LEAD” can be inter-
preted as LEAD treatment times a selfish leader. PD is an
abbreviation for payoff dominance.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 4.5: Regression Table - Violation of payoff dom-
inance
Observation 3. Leadership can be a useful tool in preventing an early violation
of the payoff dominance condition. The sequential treatment LEAD delays the first
occurrence of the event, that at least one individual does not strictly improve, on
average, by one round. The behavioral type of the leader is again crucial in this
context.
4.4.4 Further analysis of the LEAD treatment
In this section, I want to take a closer look behind the mechanisms of effective
leadership and investigate why some groups in LEAD are more successful than
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others. I begin by analyzing the followers’ reaction and then proceed by looking at
the behavior of the leaders.
Follower behavior
The followers’ reaction is decisive for successful leading-by-example. Only if they
respond adequately, it will be ensured that leadership (i) has success in terms of the
final endowments for the group members, and additionally, (ii) that the leader does
not fare worse either.
Contribution
(1) (2)
Leader contribution (LC) 0.822∗∗∗
(0.056)
LC X SF type 0.560∗∗∗
(0.095)
LC X CC type 0.837∗∗∗
(0.056)
LC X AL type 0.909∗∗∗
(0.085)
Constant 1.526 1.830∗
(1.235) (1.087)
Period controls YES YES
Round controls YES YES
Observations 1008 1008
Subjects 47 47
R2 0.781 0.791
Note: OLS regression with period con-
trols. Cluster-robust standard errors (on
the subject-level) are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Relative Contribution
(1) (2)
Rel. leader contribution (RLC) 0.835∗∗∗
(0.027)
RLC X SF type 0.639∗∗∗
(0.101)
RLC X CC type 0.853∗∗∗
(0.024)
RLC X AL type 0.869∗∗∗
(0.080)
Constant 0.021 0.033
(0.037) (0.036)
Period controls YES YES
Round controls YES YES
Observations 1008 1008
Subjects 47 47
R2 0.701 0.711
Note: OLS regression with period controls.
Cluster-robust standard errors (on the subject-
level) are in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 4.6: Regression Table - Matching of leader contribution (absolute and relative)
I consider the reactions to a leader’s contribution both relative to a subject’s own
endowment and in absolute terms. Focusing on absolute contributions first, Table
4.6 (left) indicates that for every Taler, a leader gives in a round, followers give on
average 0.822 Taler to the public good. Additionally, follower type heterogeneity
leads to different reactions. Although all types react positively to higher contribu-
tions of the leader, this reaction is particularly pronounced for followers that were
classified as conditional cooperators and altruists, as the coefficients in Table 4.6
reveal. Selfish follower types match a Taler given by the leader by only 0.56 Taler,
which is much less compared to the amount given by conditional cooperators and
altruists. A similar pattern emerges for relative contributions (see Table 4.6 (right)).
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My result is summarized in Observation 4. This high rate of matching a leader’s
contribution further illustrates why the behavior of the leader matters a lot, since
even selfish types react positively on the amount spent by the leader.
Observation 4. In general, followers react positively to a leader’s contribution,
matching it to a large degree, both in absolute and in relative terms. The type of the
follower plays a major role as selfish followers exhibit a much smaller reaction.
Leader behavior
I have already mentioned two results on leadership. First, I find evidence that it is
important that they set a good example - best already in the beginning. Addition-
ally, the behavioral type of the leader also matters, as Figure 4.2 (right) illustrates.
In the next step, I will go more into detail to explain the mechanisms behind suc-
cessful leadership.
Figure 4.5: Leader’s relative contribution by behavioral type and round
We have seen that conditional cooperators prosper as leaders with respect to
their group members’ final earnings. A rather na¨ıve guess that they - driven by
some kind of false consensus effect - contribute a lot to the group pot at first, does
not meet the mechanism. As Figure 4.5 shows, conditional cooperators have the
lowest average initial leader contribution of all types. Rather, as Figure 4.5 also
shows, it is their persistence that makes CC types successful.
A behavior that can probably be explained by a false consensus effect, is the one
shown by those subjects which I classified as altruists. When they are leaders, they
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start with very high relative contributions in the beginning, but display a faster
decline than the CC types afterwards. By contrast, I discover signs of strategic
leadership by selfish types. They start with relatively high contributions in the
first two rounds, revising them sharply afterwards. What came to my mind was a
strategy the New York Times (Gleick, 1986) described as a ‘tranquilizer strategy’
for the repeated prisoner’s dilemma: to lull the opponent for a few moves and then
try to exploit him.
I find evidence for this claim in my data as selfish types contribute more in the
beginning when they are leaders. In round 1 of LEAD, 61.54% of the leaders, which I
classified as “selfish”, contributed their whole endowment of 20 Taler. However, only
21.74% of the selfish followers also contributed this amount. In treatment NOLEAD,
by comparison, 25.00% of the selfish types contributed 20 Taler in round 1.
Endowment (end of round 7)
(1) (2) (3)
Is leader -26.540∗∗ -25.703∗∗ 24.404
(12.829) (12.884) (27.012)
Leader’s first contribution 7.566∗∗∗ 8.351∗∗∗
(1.332) (1.433)
Leader’s first contr. X Is Leader -3.567
(2.539)
Constant 80.073∗∗∗ -15.345 -26.520∗
(11.066) (13.489) (15.160)
Period controls YES YES YES
Observations 192 192 192
Subjects 48 48 48
R2 overall 0.029 0.194 0.196
Note: Random-effects regression with period controls. Cluster-robust stan-
dard errors (on the subject-level) are in parentheses. Panel variable: subject ;
time variable: period.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 4.7: Regression Table - Final endowment (only LEAD)
Overall, a high early contribution by the leader in round 1 of a period has a large
impact on final earnings in round 7 of the respective period. In columns (2) to (3)
of Table 4.7 we can see that a leader’s first contribution has a large effect on final
wealth. E.g., in column (2) we see that for each Taler the leader gives in round 1,
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the final endowment of every group member (including the leader himself) increases
by around 7.6 Taler, on average.
The leader himself in turn, does not lose money by contributing more in round
1, but he profits less from each Taler compared to the other group members as it
can be seen by the interaction effect in column (3). However, as shown by Figure
4.6 (left), the relationship between first leader’s contributions and final wealth is
not necessarily linear, since I only observe distinct peaks for contributions of 15
and 20 Taler. Additionally, in the right part of Figure 4.6, we can observe that
there is a large heterogeneity between leader types for the 20 Taler bracket. This
provides further evidence that the success of CC leaders is not driven by their initial
contributions, but rather by their persistence.
Figure 4.6: Relationship between leader’s first contribution and final endowment
I have already reported that group members are more successful when they have
a conditional cooperator as leader. Yet, being the leader is not necessarily good
for the own payoffs as column (1) of Table 4.7 reveals. Leaders face some kind of
curse as their earnings are lower than those of other group members. This result is
not very surprising and can be explained by incomplete or selfish-biased conditional
cooperation by followers. Figure 4.7 illustrates this circumstance graphically. How-
ever, leaders do not fare worse than average participants in NOLEAD in the end.
This, too, is depicted in Figure 4.7.
Observation 5. The leader type has a significant effect on final earnings of the group
members. The results suggest that leaders classified as conditional cooperators are
successful because they give persistently a larger fraction of their endowment over
the course of a period. High first contributions by the leader, yield a high return
concerning final earnings. The leader herself is slightly better off than an average
subject in NOLEAD, but not significantly.
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Figure 4.7: Average endowment by treatment + leader/non-leader
Examples of good and bad leadership
To illustrate the effect of good and bad leadership, I present some exemplary groups
in this section. The black line in the graphs represents the leader contributions,
while the grey lines represent the follower contributions.
Figure 4.8 shows two examples of bad leadership. In the left part we see that the
leader stops contributing after three rounds, although the followers matched him
before (at least partly). This results in a breakdown of cooperation and almost no
further growth after round 3. In the right part we can observe a leader who started
with a medium contribution in the first round. After this, the leader decreases
his contribution in every subsequent round and the followers mimic this behavior,
resulting in a low final average endowment.
Figure 4.8: Bad leadership
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Figure 4.9: Good leadership
Figure 4.9 shows two examples of good leadership. In both cases the leader starts
with a full contribution of 20 Taler in the beginning. In the left part we can see that
the leader only deviates in the last round from full contribution. The same is true in
the graph on the right part, where the leader sticks to his plan of full contribution
until round 6, although one group member is a free-rider who only matches the
leader partly.
4.5 Discussion
In this chapter, I provided an experiment investigating the effect of leadership in
a dynamic public goods game with endowment carryover and, hence, endogenous
growth. In summary, the analysis of my experiment shows that leadership has a
positive impact on final wealth of the participants. The results of static public goods
games continue to hold and, consequently, also in my setting, exogenous leadership
yields an improvement of group members’ earnings. The leaders, however, benefit
less. They contribute more to the group pot than the followers, but receive lower
payouts than them. However, the average leader in LEAD is not worse off than
an average player in NOLEAD. From a welfare perspective, it can be argued that
leading-by-example leads to a Pareto improvement, when we consider the average
earnings.
I also find that the contribution of the leader in the first round, has a high impact
on the final results across all groups. For the groups, it pays off if the leader prefaces
by setting a good example in the form of a large initial contribution. The leader
himself, however, profits less from being very cooperative in the beginning.
In addition, leadership has other positive effects. I observe a significantly lower
inequality in groups with a leader compared to NOLEAD. As a measurement for
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inequality, I used the Gini index which also refers to a utilitarian social welfare
function that integrates individual inequity aversion (Schmidt and Wichardt, 2018).
From this perspective, I can report a further welfare improvement through lead-
ership which, of course, is not generally valid. Linked to this is my result that
leadership delays the point of time when at least one individual no longer benefits
from cooperation.
Based on a sequential prisoner’s dilemma, I elicited types for conditional coop-
eration in part I of the experiment. This classification of types allows me to go into
further detail. Regarding the question of who is a good leader in such a dynamic
game, the results obtained indicate that it is especially the conditional cooperators
who stand out. The mechanism is quite interesting: it is apparently less a false
consensus effect that makes conditional cooperator types successful, with regard to
group members’ final earnings, but rather their perseverance in setting a good ex-
ample. While I see signs of strategic leadership in the selfish types’ behavior, with
very high contributions in the first two rounds followed by a sharp crash, condition-
ally cooperative types change their contribution relative to income only gradually.
They are not the ones who give the highest contributions in round 1, on average.
Nevertheless, they have endurance and contribute a relatively high proportion of
their income for a long time. The subjects classified as altruists are those for whom
leadership by a false consensus effect could best be used as an argument. They make
very high contributions at the beginning, but then quickly - speculatively because of
disappointment - reduce their contributions. Regarding the reaction of the follow-
ers, I can report that followers who are either classified as conditional cooperators
or altruists, match a leader’s contribution to a higher degree than selfish types.
As a concluding remark, I can state that leading-by-example seems to be a very
useful tool in public good environments. I find that it has a positive effect on both
final wealth across groups and reducing inequality within groups. In a dynamic
public goods game setting with endowment carryover, I can further show that the
benefits of leadership especially come into play in the long run.
In the next chapter, I will take a closer look at different methods for classifying
cooperation types. My aim here is to investigate whether two structurally different
procedures are consistent.
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5 Consistency of cooperation types51
One of the main contributions of behavioral economics is to establish the behavioral
relevance of another type beyond the purely payoff-maximizing “homo oeconomi-
cus”, named “homo reciprocans”, who represents a large fraction of the population.52
If a researcher needs to determine behavioral types of subjects in the lab, there are
essentially two methods available to him. On the one hand, he can use the method
introduced by Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr (2001) which relies on a conditional
contribution vector elicited by the strategy method in a one-shot public goods game
(FGF hereafter).53 This method is typically based on a set of 22 questions.54 On the
other hand, a simple sequential prisoner’s dilemma (SPD hereafter), for which only
three questions are sufficient, can be used for type classification as well (Miettinen,
Kosfeld, Fehr, and Weibull, 2017; Kosfeld, 2019; Eichenseer and Moser, 2019b). For
a researcher, the question arises whether using the simpler method is sufficient for
type classification as it may save time and reduce cognitive load for the participants.
To the best of my knowledge, there exists no systematic comparison of classification
congruence between these two procedures.
Consequently, the aim of this paper is to assess the stability of classifications
across games thereby contributing to the literature on the within subject stability
of cooperation preferences (Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann, 2011; Volk, Tho¨ni,
and Ruigrok, 2012). To this end, I compare the types assigned by SPD to those
assigned by FGF in its latest refinements (Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy, 2018;
Tho¨ni and Volk, 2018). The remainder of this paper will be as follows: Section 5.1
describes the experimental design and procedures. Section 5.2 presents and discusses
my results. Section 5.3 provides as short summary and concludes.
5.1 Design and procedures
5.1.1 Protocol
The experiment was conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk henceforth)
in December 2018 using a sample of MTurk experienced US residents. In total,
232 participants took part in the experiment earning $2.85 on average with an
average completion time of approximately 13 minutes. About half of the subjects
51This chapter is a slightly modified version of Eichenseer and Moser (2019a).
52See, for example, Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000), Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2009), and
Kosfeld (2019).
53This method is by now the most commonly used one and, for example, labeled as ‘P-
Experiment’ in Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (2010).
54As a second-mover, subjects are typically asked to specify their contribution conditional on the
other players’ average contribution for integers in the interval [0, 20]. This results in 21 questions
plus an unconditional contribution question for the role as first-mover.
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(120) played SPD first, while the other half (112) was doing the FGF task first.
Subsequently, the participants completed a short questionnaire on age, gender, and
education. Instructions for the experiment can be found in Appendix A.
5.1.2 Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (SPD)
In the SPD we have two players, indexed by i = 1, 2. Each player can choose between
actions SEND (S) and KEEP (K). Choices are elicited by using the strategy method
such that Player 2 can condition his choice on the action of Player 1. Figure 5.1
depicts the structure of the game in extensive form including the resulting final
payoffs in POINTS (worth $0.05 each). The social optimum is reached when Player
1 chooses S and Player 2 responds with action S as well. However, maximizing
their own payoffs means that Player 2 will choose action K at both decision nodes
and Player 1, who anticipates this behavior, chooses K at the beginning. This is
the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game. Hence, the decision situation
resembles a sequential prisoner’s dilemma.
P1
P2
(20 , 20)
S
(0 , 30)
K
S
P2
(30 , 0)
S
(10 , 10)
K
K
Figure 5.1: Payoff structure of the sequential prisoner’s dilemma
All subjects state decisions for both being Player 1 and 2 (strategy method).
They are randomly allocated to one of these roles at the end of the experiment and
paid accordingly. The set of strategies, Xi, in this game for Player 2 is given by
Xi = {SS,KK, SK,KS}.
55 Based on the participants’ conditional second mover’s
choices, I can classify subjects as altruists (unconditional cooperators), conditional
cooperators (cooperate only if the first-mover cooperates), free-riders (never coop-
erate), and mismatchers (counteract the other player) as depicted in Table 5.1.
55The first action is played when Player 1 chooses SEND and the second action is played when
Player 1 chooses KEEP.
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Cooperation type Strategy
Conditional cooperator (CC) (SEND,KEEP )
Selfish (SF) (KEEP,KEEP )
Altruist (AL) (SEND,SEND)
Mismatcher (MM) (KEEP, SEND)
Table 5.1: Cooperation types in SPD
5.1.3 Sequential Public Goods Game (FGF)
For the conditional contributions task in FGF, I used an adapted version of the
procedure of Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr (2001). Four players, indexed by
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, play a sequential public goods game in which one player makes his
contribution after observing the other three players’ rounded average contribution
when they were moving simultaneously beforehand. The resulting payoff of player i
with initial endowment yi = 20 POINTS is given by:
πi = yi − gi + α
4∑
j=1
gj
where gi ∈ [0, 20] denotes individual contributions and α = 0.4 is the marginal per
capita return (MPCR) of the public good. Choices are elicited by using the strategy
method such that every player i makes a choice both for being one of the three first-
movers (unconditional contribution) and being a second-mover (contribution table).
As a second-mover, subjects condition their contribution gi on the average contribu-
tion (rounded to the next integer) of the first-movers which results in a conditional
contribution path. Subjects are randomly assigned roles of first- and second-movers
at the end of the experiment. For the type classification, only the contribution ta-
ble of a subject is considered. The classification of Fischbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr
(2001) results in four types: a conditional cooperator whose contributions increase
with other players’ contributions, a selfish type who never cooperates, a triangle
cooperator with hump-shaped contributions, and the remaining subjects who do not
fit either one of the classifications.
Recently, there have been two proposals to refine the classification based on Fis-
chbacher, Ga¨chter, and Fehr (2001): (i) the method of Tho¨ni and Volk (2018), which
is based on the Pearson correlation coefficient and (ii) the method of Fallucchi, Luc-
casen, and Turocy (2018), which is based on hierarchical clustering. I will describe
the behavioral types resulting from both refinements in Section 5.2.2. They have
in common that they entail a behavioral type whose description comes close to the
altruist in SPD : the unconditional cooperator (UC) in Tho¨ni and Volk (2018) and
the unconditional high type (UHC) in Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy (2018).
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5.2 Results
5.2.1 Contribution paths in FGF by SPD type
As a first step in my data analysis, I provide a visual inspection to see whether there
is a systematic relationship between behavioral types in SPD and contribution paths
in FGF which follow from the subjects’ conditional contributions. Figure 5.2 depicts
contribution paths in FGF by SPD type.56
Figure 5.2: Contribution paths by SPD classification in FGF
There are considerable differences between types. Compared to subjects classified
as ‘selfish’ in SPD, contributions of ‘conditional cooperators’ (CC) have a decisively
steeper slope in the contributions of others, i.e., they match others’ contributions to
a larger degree. In addition, subjects classified as ‘altruist’ in SPD have the highest
intercept which reflects that they give most when others give nothing. In line with
expectations, ‘selfish’ types have, on average, the lowest conditional contributions
for every level of average contributions of others.
In Table 5.2, I examine whether this visual interpretation can be supported
statistically. Columns OLS(1) and Tobit(1) assume a common slope of all types in
the average contribution of others (ACO) - and only different intercepts - whereas
OLS(2) and Tobit(2) take different slopes for different SPD types into account.
The Tobit regressions consider observations censored at 0 and 20. Both regressions
56I excluded the mismatcher type in this graph, since it is a rare empirical phenomenon (9 of
232 subjects) whose behavior is difficult to interpret.
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OLS(2) and Tobit(2) indicate that conditional cooperators show a significantly larger
reaction to others’ contributions compared to the reference category of selfish types.
This corresponds to the graphical findings reported in Figure 5.2. Moreover, the
coefficient of the intercept - the unconditional contribution - is largest for the altruist
type and significantly different from the reference category of selfish types in the
regressions OLS(1), Tobit(1), and Tobit(2).
Contribution
OLS(1) OLS(2) Tobit(1) Tobit(2)
Conditional cooperator 4.573∗∗∗ 0.174 7.688∗∗∗ 3.394∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.350) (1.003) (1.021)
Altruist 6.426∗∗∗ 3.781 10.299∗∗∗ 8.432∗∗
(1.798) (2.410) (2.796) (3.639)
Mismatcher 3.545∗∗∗ 2.339∗ 6.970∗∗∗ 7.415∗∗∗
(0.999) (1.278) (1.455) (2.142)
Avg. contr. of others (ACO) 0.665∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.970∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.045) (0.034) (0.061)
Conditional cooperator X ACO 0.440∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.074)
Altruist X ACO 0.265∗ 0.148
(0.142) (0.182)
Mismatcher X ACO 0.121 -0.075
(0.144) (0.188)
Constant -3.071∗∗∗ -0.358∗∗ -10.007∗∗∗ -7.115∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.170) (1.017) (0.933)
Observations 4872 4872 4872 4872
Subjects 232 232 232 232
R2 0.483 0.518
Pseudo R2 0.114 0.118
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors (on the subject-level) are in parentheses. Tobit re-
gressions account for 1,646 left-censored and 346 right-censored observations. ACO stands
for “average contributions of others”. The ‘selfish’ type serves as a reference category.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 5.2: Regression Table - Contribution paths
5.2.2 Relationship between classification methods
I now investigate the relationship between the discrete behavioral types classified by
SPD and FGF in the refinements of Tho¨ni and Volk (2018) and Fallucchi, Luccasen,
and Turocy (2018). The refinement of Tho¨ni and Volk (2018) of FGF (FGF-T here-
after) resembles a theory-driven approach and is based on the Pearson correlation
coefficient. It distinguishes the five behavioral types depicted in Table 5.3.
In my sample, I can categorize 184 out of 232 subjects (79.3%) as conditional cooper-
ators (CC) using the FGF-T refinement.57 Conditional cooperators also constitute
57This is close to the 80.6% CC share reported in the US sample of Kocher, Cherry, Kroll,
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Type Behavior
Free-rider (FR) Zero contributions.
Conditional cooperator (CC) Monotonically increasing pattern in others’ contributions.
Unconditional cooperator (UC) Constant contributions irrespective of what others do.
Triangle cooperator (TC) “Hump-shaped” contributions.
Other Undefined contribution pattern.
Table 5.3: Cooperation types in Tho¨ni and Volk (2018)
the largest group in SPD with a share of 57.8%. The second largest group are selfish
types that account for 33.6% of all subjects in SPD and 13.8% in FGF-T. In both
games, these two categories cover the vast majority of subjects. Table 5.4 reports
the number and percentage of subjects falling into each possible combination of the
two methods in a contingency table.
Behavioral type FGF − T
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e
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FR CC UC TR Other Total
Selfish 27 44 1 5 1 78
(11.64%) (18.97%) (0.43%) (2.16%) (0.43%) (33.62%)
CC 4 125 2 2 1 134
(1.72%) (53.88%) (0.86%) (0.86%) (0.43%) (57.76%)
Altruist 1 8 2 0 0 11
(0.43%) (3.45%) (0.86%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (4.74%)
Mismatcher 0 7 2 0 0 9
(0.00%) (3.02%) (0.86%) (0.00%) (0.00%) (3.88%)
Total 32 184 7 7 2 232
(13.79%) (79.31%) (3.02%) (3.02%) (0.86%) (100.00%)
Table 5.4: Types in SPD and FGF (Refinement of Tho¨ni and Volk, 2018)
Comparing the classification of SPD and FGF-T, we see that slightly more than
half of all subjects (125 of 232) are classified as CC according to both methods, while
11.6% are classified as selfish types in both games (27 of 232). Overall, only around
13.8% of the subjects (32 of 232) are classified in a category different from selfish or
CC according to at least one of the methods. The results of a χ2-test suggests that
the characteristics of both methods are not independent (p < 0.001). Hence, I can
reject the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between the two classification
methods.
Conditional relative frequencies allows me to get a better picture of the type
stability across games. About 93.3% of the subjects who are classified as CC in
SPD, are also classified as CC according to FGF-T. However, individuals classified
as ‘selfish’ in SPD, are classified as ‘selfish’ according to FGF-T only in around
34.6% of the cases. This indicates that SPD performs well in identifying subjects
who have a consistent pattern of conditional cooperation across games, while this
Netzer, and Sutter (2008).
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does not hold for selfish types.
Conversely, starting from FGF, subjects classified as CC according to FGF-T,
are in around 67.9% of the cases also CC in SPD, and those who are classified as
‘selfish’ according to FGF-T are in around 84.4% of the cases also ‘selfish’ in SPD.
This means that FGF is better suited to identify types who are classified as ‘selfish’
in both games compared to SPD.
Type Behavior
Own maximizers (OWN) Zero contributions.
Strong conditional cooperators (SCC) Match others’ contributions exactly.
Weak conditional cooperators (WCC) Increasing contributions, but less than one-for-one.
Unconditional high contributors (UCH) Contribute fully irrespective of what others do.
Other Undefined contribution pattern.
Table 5.5: Cooperation types in Fallucchi et al. (2018)
These findings are robust when changing to the refinement of Fallucchi, Luc-
casen, and Turocy (2018), which is based on hierarchical clustering and resembles
a data-driven approach (FGF-F hereafter). The FGF-F categorization splits the
CC category and distinguishes between weak conditional cooperators (WCC) and
strong conditional cooperators (SCC). The type classification of FGF-F is depicted
in Table 5.5. In my experimental sample, there has not been a distinct cluster of
‘Other’ types and, hence, I only consider four behavioral types.
Behavioral type FGF − F
B
e
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S
P
D
OWN WCC SCC UCH Total
Selfish 31 37 10 0 78
(13.86%) (15.95%) (4.31%) (0.00%) (33.62%)
CC 11 45 74 4 134
(4.74%) (19.40%) (31.90%) (1.72%) (57.76%)
Altruist 1 2 6 2 11
(0.43%) (0.86%) (2.59%) (0.86%) (4.74%)
Mismatcher 0 6 3 0 9
(0.00%) (2.59%) (1.29%) (0.00%) (3.88%)
Total 43 90 93 6 232
(18.53%) (38.79%) (40.09%) (2.59%) (100.00%)
Table 5.6: Types in SPD and FGF (Refinement of Fallucchi et al., 2018)
Table 5.6 presents the contingency table of types. Again, a χ2-test shows that
the type classifications are not independent (p < 0.001), indicating a significant rela-
tionship between the two methods. If we look at the conditional relative frequencies,
we see that conditional on being classified as CC type in SPD, the relative frequency
is 88.8% to be classified as either WCC or SCC according to FGF-F. By contrast,
a subject classified as selfish in SPD is only selfish in 39.7% of the cases according
to FGF-F.
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Starting from FGF-F, a subject sorted in the group of selfish types according
to FGF-F, is also selfish in SPD in 72.1% of the cases. By contrast, the relative
frequency of being CC in SPD is only 65.0% when being classified as either WCC
and SCC according to FGF-F. When distinguishing between WCC and SCC, I
observe that in the group of those who are classified as WCC according to FGF-F,
only 50% are also classified as CC in SPD, whereas in the group of those who are
classified as SCC, almost 80% are classified as CC in SPD. Thus, the distinction
between WCC and SCC predicts the relative frequency of being CC in SPD quite
well. Likewise, the relative frequency of being selfish in SPD is highest for OWN
maximizers, followed by WCC and SCC types.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the respective intersections between SPD and FGF
- for CC and selfish types - graphically by using Venn diagrams. The solid cir-
cles represent the respective sets of CC and selfish types according to SPD, while
the dashed circles represent these types according to the FGF classification. The
intersection of both circles illustrates the set of subjects who are of the same type
according to both methods. In Figure 5.4 (left), the WCC and SCC types are pooled
as conditional cooperators.
Figure 5.3: Venn diagrams of SPD and FGF-T (Tho¨ni and Volk, 2018)
The fact that the overlap between selfish types in SPD and FGF is quite small
leaves room for further research. One hypothesis would be that the FGF method
underestimates the share of selfish types. Confused types, who do not understand
the rules of the game completely, may act as if they were cooperative types in FGF
(see Detemple, Kosfeld, and Kro¨ll, 2019). Assuming that the SPD imposes fewer
cognitive load on subjects would allow for the hypothesis that the share of confused
types is lower in this game and, consequently, the share of selfish types should be
higher in SPD compared to the FGF method. This might explain why many of the
selfish types in SPD behave cooperatively in FGF.
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Figure 5.4: Venn diagrams of SPD and FGF-F (Fallucchi et al., 2018)
5.3 Summary and discussion
I provided an online experiment, in which I investigated the consistency of two meth-
ods for classifying different cooperation types. With regard to discrete behavioral
types, my results indicate that SPD performs very well in identifying subjects with
a stable pattern of conditional cooperation. Given that a subject is of CC type in
SPD, the probability is 93.3% to be classified as CC as well according to FGF-T
(refinement of Tho¨ni and Volk, 2018) and 88.8% according to FGF-F (refinement
of Fallucchi, Luccasen, and Turocy, 2018), respectively. I further observe that the
distinction between WCC and SCC is helpful for identifying CC types in SPD more
precisely, since the likelihood for being ‘selfish’ in SPD is considerably higher for
WCC types compared to SCC types.
Considering contribution paths in FGF, subjects classified as conditional cooper-
ators in SPD match others’ contributions to a significantly larger degree compared
to selfish types. This is captured in the significantly larger slope of their conditional
cooperation path.
On this basis, I can conclude that if a researcher’s objective is to identify those
subjects in a group who are, with a high probability, conditional cooperators in both
games, the simple method of the SPD is well suited for this task. If, on the other
hand, the focus is on identifying selfish types, I cannot offer a clear conclusion. I
observe many ‘selfish’ subjects in SPD who show cooperative behavioral patterns
in FGF. However, based on the hypothesis that there is a larger share of confused
types in FGF, who act as if they were CC types, the simpler game (SPD) is not
necessarily a weak tool for identifying selfish types, but may be more accurate in
measuring the true fraction of selfish types in the population (see Detemple, Kosfeld,
and Kro¨ll, 2019).
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6 Conclusion
In this thesis, I presented four experiments in the field of behavioral economics to
investigate the causes and consequences of non-standard decision-making in several
economic and social environments. Two of the experiments were conducted in the
lab and two of them were conducted as online experiments. The aim of my research
was to take a closer look at the underlying channels of deviations from standard-
economic behavior with a focus on cognitive biases.
In Section 2, I have shown that mistakes in hypothetical thinking often lead to
suboptimally high or low bids in auctions. The overall pattern of my data suggests
that the problem of irrational over- and underbidding can be weakened by giving
the subjects ex ante feedback about their bid, but unlike related studies I also find
negative effects of additional information. Hence, I showed that the effect of the
provided information strongly depends on the context and, overall, I can conclude
that through information subjects do not suddenly become more sophisticated, but
rather they adapt their heuristics.
In Section 3, I demonstrated that the cognitive bias of correlation neglect is
present in a voting environment where individuals received correlated signals. How-
ever, in a setup where groups can reach beneficial results through information aggre-
gation, this mental bias can actually lead to an improvement of the voting results,
because voters suffering from correlation neglect vote less often according to their
ideological preferences and focus more on their available information instead. This
in turn leads to the pattern that groups receiving two perfectly correlated signals
instead of only one signal are, on average, more successful - even though they have
no information advantage.
In Section 4, I have shown that groups in a public goods game, with a first-
mover who contributes first, are substantially more successful compared to groups
without a leader. This is expressed in both a higher income and a lower inequality.
Additionally, I demonstrated that the type of the leader matters a lot, since groups
lead by cooperatively inclined individuals generate significantly higher earnings.
In Section 5, I demonstrated that two well-known methods in the literature for
eliciting cooperation types are consistent to a large extent. Furthermore, I have
shown that each of the methods has its own strengths and weaknesses and that the
choice of the proper method depends strongly on the underlying research question.
As a concluding remark there is to say, that there are many more research op-
portunities in the field of behavioral and experimental economics and a lot more
work is needed to solve further urgent puzzles. The humble attempt of this thesis
is to close some of the most important gaps in the literature. I hope that I have
succeeded with my work.
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A Figures & Tables (Section 2 - winner’s curse)
Decision screens
Figure A.1: Typical decision screen in stage I.
89
Figure A.2: Typical decision screen in stage II (treatment INF).
90
Figure A.3: Typical decision screen in stage II (treatment NOINF).
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Distribution of bids
Figure A.4: Distribution of bids in stage I
Figure A.5: Distribution of bids in stage II (INF)
Figure A.6: Distribution of bids in stage II (NOINF)
92
Illustration of Nash range
Figure A.7: Corridor of Nash range
Robustness checks
Bid is in Nash range in stage I (YES [1] or NO [0])
lsH lsL hsH hsL H L Overall
INF 0.002 0.081 -0.023 -0.053∗∗ -0.010 0.039 0.021
(0.059) (0.100) (0.057) (0.022) (0.042) (0.071) (0.043)
Constant 0.063 0.311∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.082) (0.048) (0.022) (0.033) (0.057) (0.033)
Observations 140 376 391 173 531 549 1080
Subjects 49 70 70 50 70 70 72
R2 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.030 0.000 0.002 0.001
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors (on the subject-level) are in parentheses. Constellation
lsH stands for low signals paired with the information HIGHER. Constellation L stands for all
signals paired with the information LOWER. The other constellations are defined analogously.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.1: Regression Table - Bid in Nash range (Stage I)
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Changes across the bidding ranges
lsH lsL hsH hsL H L Overall
INF 0.359∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.023 0.124 0.057 -0.114∗ -0.033
(0.096) (0.077) (0.039) (0.102) (0.036) (0.068) (0.039)
Constant 0.051∗ -0.018 -0.000 0.092 0.016 0.017 0.016
(0.029) (0.056) (0.029) (0.063) (0.022) (0.045) (0.023)
Observations 140 376 391 173 531 549 1080
Subjects 49 70 70 50 70 70 72
R2 0.193 0.054 0.002 0.026 0.008 0.014 0.002
Notes: Cluster-robust standard errors (on the subject-level) are in parentheses. Constellation
lsH stands for low signals paired with the information HIGHER. Constellation L stands for all
signals paired with the information LOWER. The other constellations are defined analogously.
The dependent variable indicates whether a bid was shifted from one range to the other across
the stages (shifted from Nash to unsophisticated range (−1); not shifted from one range to the
other (0); shifted from unsophisticated to Nash range (1)).
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table A.2: Regression Table - Changes across the bidding ranges
Figure A.8: Fraction of changed bids across the 15 rounds
94
B Proofs (Section 2 - winner’s curse)
Proof of Proposition 2. Bidding b1(x1) = α ·x1 and b2(x2) =
α
α−1
·x2 are equilibrium
strategies for any α > 1.
Consider two players, indexed by i = 1, 2. Suppose, without loss of generality,
player 1 follows the bidding rule b1(x1) = α · x1. Player 2 knows that the price he
has to pay in the winning case is equal to p = α · x1. So winning is beneficial for
him as long as x1 + x2 ≥ p⇔ x2 +
p
α
≥ p⇔ x2 ≥ p ·
α−1
α
⇔ p ≤ α
α−1
· x2. Since we
have a second-price auction, player 2 will bid exactly b2(x2) =
α
α−1
· x2.
Now, suppose player 2 follows the bidding rule b2(x2) =
α
α−1
·x2. Player 1 knows
that the price he has to pay in the winning case is equal to p = α
α−1
·x2. So winning
is beneficial for him as long as x1+x2 ≥ p⇔ x1+p ·
α−1
α
≥ p⇔ x1 ≥
p
α
⇔ p ≤ α ·x1.
Since we have a second-price auction, player 1 will bid exactly b1(x1) = α · x1.
Hence, bidding b1(x1) = α · x1 and b2(x2) =
α
α−1
· x2 are equilibrium strategies
for any α > 1. For α = 2 we have the unique symmetric equilibrium. Note that this
argumentation does not rely on the distribution of the signals x1 and x2.
Proof of Proposition 3. Any bid bi(xi) outside the interval [xi, xi + 60] is weakly
dominated. Consider two players, indexed by i = 1, 2.
(i) Bidding below xi is weakly dominated by bidding xi. If player 1 would have
lost the auction with b1(x1) = x1, deviating to a bid below x1 (b
′
1(x1) < b1(x1))
would not change the result because b′1(x1) < b1(x1) ≤ b2(x2). If player 1 would
have won the auction with b1(x1) = x1, he receives a payoff of at least 0, because
the value of the object is at least x1 and b2(x2) ≤ b1(x1) = x1. Deviating to a bid
below x1 can lead to losing an auction that generated a positive payoff. This is the
case if player 1 bids x1 − δ and player 2 bids x1 − ǫ with δ > ǫ ≥ 0. Thus, player 1
gives up an auction that guarantees a payoff of at least x1+x2−x1+ ǫ = x2+ ǫ ≥ 0.
If ǫ > δ > 0, player 1 still wins when he deviates, but the payoff does not change,
because he still receives x1 + x2 − x1 + ǫ = x2 + ǫ as before.
(ii) Bidding above xi + 60 is weakly dominated by bidding xi + 60. If player 1
would have won the auction with b1(x1) = x1 + 60, he receives either a positive,
negative or zero payoff. Deviating to a bid above x1 + 60 ((b
′
1(x1) > b1(x1)) would
not change the result because b′1(x1) > b1(x1) ≥ b2(x2) and the price to pay remains
b2(x2). If player 1 would have lost the auction with b1(x1) = x1 + 60, he receives a
payoff of 0. Deviating to a bid above x1 + 60 can lead to winning the auction, but
the payoff is at best 0, because the value of the object is at most equal to x1 + 60
and the price to pay remains b2(x2) with b2(x2) ≥ b1(x1) = x1 + 60. So if player 1
deviates to x1 + 60 + δ and player 2 bids x1 + 60 + ǫ with δ > ǫ ≥ 0, player 1 faces
a loss of at least ǫ ≥ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose two players bid according to b1(x1) = α · x1 and
b2(x2) =
α
α−1
· x2. For any α 6= 2 one player has a slope strictly greater than
2. For α > 2 the proof is trivial. For α < 2 we have the following equivalence:
α
α−1
> 2⇔ α > 2 · (α− 1)⇔ α > 2 · α− 2⇔ 2 > α.
Now suppose, without loss of generality, that player 1 uses the bidding function
b1(x1) = α · x1 with α = 2 + ǫ for ǫ > 0. For x1 = 60 the bid is then given by
b1(x1) = α ·60 = 2 ·60+ǫ ·60 = 120+ǫ ·60. It follows that 120+ǫ ·60 > x1+60 = 120
for all ǫ > 0. By definition of Proposition 3, this bid is weakly dominated. So we
have found at least one signal for which the resulting bid is weakly dominated for
all ǫ > 0.
Alternatively we can also show that for each α > 2, we can find a x1 ∈ [50, 60] for
which b1(x1) = α·x1 is weakly dominated. We have to show that α·x1 > x1+60 holds
for at least some x1, for an arbitrary α > 2. This inequation holds if x1 >
60
α−1
:= γ.
For α > 2 we have that γ < 60. Hence, we can always find a x1 ∈ [50, 60] for which
x1 > γ holds.
Proof of Proposition 5. If a player bids according to bi(xi) = xi + 30 in stage I and
the other player does not use any weakly dominated bids, he can predict in stage II
whether the signal of the other player is low or high when (i) he wins with a low
signal or (ii) he loses with a high signal.
Consider two players, indexed by i = 1, 2. Suppose, without loss of generality,
player 1 follows the bidding rule b1(x1) = x1 + 30 and player 2 does not use any
weakly dominated bids. This means for each x2, player 2 may choose any bid in a
range of [x2, x2 + 60].
(i) Player 1 has a low signal (x1 ∈ {0, . . . , 10}) and wins: Player 1 wins with a
bid of b1(x1) = x1 + 30. This means his bid can be in a range of [30, 40]. If player 2
has a low signal, his bid can be in a range of [0, 70]. If player 2 has a high signal, his
bid can be in a range of [50, 120]. So player 1 wins only if player 2 has a low signal.
(ii) Player 1 has a high signal (x1 ∈ {50, . . . , 60}) and loses: Player 1 loses with a
bid of b1(x1) = x1 + 30. This means his bid can be in a range of [80, 90]. If player 2
has a low signal, his bid can be in a range of [0, 70]. If player 2 has a high signal,
his bid can be in a range of [50, 120]. So player 1 loses only if player 2 has a high
signal.
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C Instructions (Section 2 - winner’s curse)
We would like to welcome you to this economic experiment! During the experiment
you have the possibility to conduct a task that is explained in detail in the following
instructions. In the experiment you can win a non-negligible amount of money. The
amount of your payoff depends on your decisions, on the other participants’ deci-
sions and on chance. During the experiment it is forbidden to communicate with
the other participants. Please read through the instructions at hand thoroughly.
Should you have questions before or during the experiment, please raise your hand
and an experimenter will come to your seat.
General Structure
The experiment consists of two parts. First, part 1 will be explained. After part 1
ends, you will receive separate instructions for part 2. Your decisions in part 1 do
not influence your payoff in part 2. During the whole experiment you can earn Taler.
These will be converted into Euros after the experiment. The conversion rate is
10 Taler = 1 EURO
At the beginning of the experiment you are endowed with 50 Taler. Your experi-
mental credit at the end of the experiment consists of these 50 Taler plus your profits
and minus your losses in part 1 and part 2. If you lose more than 50 Taler in the
course of the experiment, your experimental credit drops down to 0 Taler. At the
end of the experiment you receive your experimental credit in EUR. Anyway, inde-
pendent of your decisions in the course of the experiment, you will receive 4 EUR
show-up fee at the end of the experiment. Your final payout will be calculated as
follows:
Final Payout = 4 EUR + experimental credit from part 1 and part 2 (in
EUR)
Important remark
All numerical examples that are used in the instructions, and later on in the control
questions for exemplification, consist of arbitrary values and do not give a hint for
optimal behavior in this experiment!
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Part 1
Basic idea
This experiment’s underlying task is the following:
• Together with one other player you participate in an auction
• You and the other player receive each a randomly selected sealed envelope
that contains money
• There are red and blue envelopes
• A red envelope contains a random integer amount between 0 and 10 Taler
(all values are equally likely)
• A blue envelope contains a random integer amount between 50 and 60 Taler
(all values are equally likely)
• Both colors are equally likely
• Thus, all together, there are 22 different amounts an envelope can contain and
every amount is equally likely
• The colors and the amounts in both envelopes are independent of one an-
other and it is also possible that both players receive the same amount
The following combinations are possible:
Player 1 Envelope (0-10 Taler) Player 2 Envelope (0-10 Taler)
Player 1 Envelope (0-10 Taler) Player 2 Envelope (50-60 Taler)
Player 1 Envelope (50-60 Taler) Player 2 Envelope (0-10 Taler)
Player 1 Envelope (50-60 Taler) Player 2 Envelope (50-60 Taler)
Both players are allowed to open their own envelope. This implies that every player
learns his own amount, but not the other player’s amount and color.
Then, both players participate in an auction, in which the highest bidder can win
both envelopes and the money the envelopes contain.
Both players can submit a bid once only. The highest bidder wins both envelopes
and pays the bid of the inferior bidder. The inferior bidder does not receive an enve-
lope and does not have to pay anything - thus, he does neither make profit nor losses.
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The rules in detail
Bidding
You and the other player can submit once only an integer bid between 0 and 120
Taler. These bids are made secretly, i.e., the other player does not see what bid
you have made and vice versa.
Winning and Losing
The winner and the payoff are determined as follows:
You win if:
1. Your bid is higher than the other player’s bid
2. Your bid equals the other player’s bid and your envelope contains more money
If your bids and the contents of the envelopes are equal, both players receive a payoff
of 0. If your bid is lower than the other player’s bid, you lose and receive a payoff of 0.
Payoff
If you have won the auction, your payoff is calculated as follows:
You receive the money of both envelopes and you have to pay the other player’s
bid. Thus, you do not pay your own bid, but the bid of the inferior bidder. This
implies that in the winning case you must pay at most your own bid.
Is the amount of both envelopes higher than the bid you have to pay, you make
profit. Is the amount of both envelopes lower than the bid you have to pay, you
make a loss. If you have lost the auction, you receive a payoff of 0 - thus, you do
neither make profit nor losses.
Example
Assume you would have 50 Taler in your envelope and the other player would have
10 Taler in his envelope (every player only knows his own amount). You bid 90 Taler
and the other player bids 45 Taler (every player only knows his own bid). You win
the auction, because you have submitted the higher bid. So you win both envelopes
and pay the other player’s bid. Your profit in this round would be 60−45 = 15
Taler. The other player’s profit would be 0 Taler.
The course of the experiment
Trial phase
At first you will bid in 5 trial rounds for the envelopes. During these 5 rounds you
do not play against another human player, but against a computer. These rounds
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are not relevant for your payoff and their only purpose is to gain an understand-
ing of the game and its general course. In every round you and the computer will
receive a randomly selected amount between 0 and 10 or 50 and 60. This implies
for you that you see in every round a randomly selected integer number between
0 and 10 or 50 and 60 on your screen. This number symbolizes the content
of an envelope (you can find an example screenshot at the bottom of this page).
You only learn your own amount, but not your computer opponent’s amount and
vice versa. Now, you can submit once (per round) any integer bid between 0 and
120 Taler. Overall, you participate in 5 auctions. After every round (i.e., after
every bid) you receive an immediate feedback on your hypothetical profit or loss.
However, you do not learn the opponent’s bid or the amount the computer received.
The computer is programmed to choose a bid that depends on his amount, i.e., the
higher the computer’s amount the higher the bid the computer chooses.
[SCREEN 1]
Main phase
After the trial phase you bid in 15 rounds for the envelopes and now you can receive
an actual monetary payoff. In the main phase you do not compete with a com-
puter but with a human player. Your opponent will be randomly drawn from this
room. You do neither know who your opponent is nor does your opponent know
this. The general course will be similar as in the trial phase. This means, in every
round you and the other player will see a respective amount on your screens, which
is a randomly selected number between 0 and 10 or between 50 and 60 that sym-
bolizes the content of an envelope. In every round you and the other player
can submit any integer bid between 0 and 120 Taler. But now, you do not receive
an immediate feedback after each bid and you learn your final payoff only at the
very end of the experiment (i.e., only when part 2 is finished). Out of the 15
rounds 3 randomly selected rounds are relevant for your payoff. The other
12 rounds do not influence your payoff. Your profit or loss from this three randomly
selected rounds is added to or subtracted from your initial endowment of 50 Taler,
respectively.
Example
Assume round 1,2 and 3 are randomly selected for the payoff. In round 1 your payoff
is 30 Taler, in round 2 your payoff is −5 Taler and in round 3 your payoff is 0 Taler.
Your profit in part 1 would be 25 Taler. Your current experimental credit would be
50+25 = 75 Taler.
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[SCREEN 2]
Part 2
You will now bid for the envelopes once again. For this purpose you and your previ-
ous opponent will receive the same amounts as in part 1 again in the same order.
In contrast to the previous part you do not bid directly against your opponent, but
against his decisions that he made in part 1. This implies that your opponent
does not make new decisions in part 2 and he will bid in every round exactly as in
part 1. As you only compete with your opponent indirectly, your decisions in part 2
do not influence the payoff of your opponent in part 2.
In part 2 you are randomly assigned to a role: either A or B. Both roles are equally
likely. Your role is determined before the beginning of the 15 rounds by a virtual
coin toss. Your respective role is constant for all 15 rounds and is displayed at the
top of the screen.
If your role is A, you see for every amount additionally on the screen, whether your
respective bid in part 1 was HIGHER or LOWER than the other player’s bid. If
the bids are equal, you will also see “LOWER” on your screen (thus, “HIGHER”
means strictly higher and “LOWER” means lower or equal). If your role is B, you
receive no further information in part 2 and instead of HIGHER or LOWER you
only see “???” on your screen.
Independent of your role you are once again, in every round, allowed to submit a
bid, which can be as in part 1 between 0 and 120 Taler. The rules for winning and
losing are exactly as in part 1 and also your payoff is computed equally. As already
in part 1, the same three randomly selected rounds determine your payoff (i.e., if
round 1, 2 and 3 were selected in part 1, round 1, 2 and 3 also determine your
payoff in part 2). Your profit or loss from part 2 is added to or subtracted from your
current experimental credit. Also in part 2 you do not receive immediate feedback
after every bid, but you learn your final payoff only at the very end of the experiment.
Summarized
• Part 2 is a repetition of the main phase of part 1
• In part 2 you have the same opponent as already in part 1
• Now you do not compete with your opponent directly, but with his decisions
he made in part 1
• Your opponent will bid in part 2 exactly as in part 1
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• You are randomly assigned to either role A or B
• If your role is A, you additionally see whether your bid in part 1 was higher
or lower than the other player’s bid
• If your role is B, you do not receive additional information
[SCREEN 3]
[SCREEN 4]
Example (role - A)
Part 1 - 1st round: You have 50 Taler in your envelope and the other player has 10
Taler in his envelope (every player only knows his own amount). You bid 90 Taler
and the other player bids 45 Taler (every player only knows his own bid).
Part 2 - 1st round: Now, you receive once again an envelope that contains 50 Taler
and the other player again receives an envelope that contains 10 Taler (every player
only knows his own amount). Now, you see on your screen that your bid in part 1
was HIGHER than the other player’s bid (as 90 is larger than 45 - anyway, also in
part 2 you do not know the other player’s exact bid). Now, you can submit any bid
between 0 and 120 Taler once again. The other player bids 45 Taler as in part 1.
Example (role - B)
Part 1 - 1st round: You have 50 Taler in your envelope and the other player has 10
Taler in his envelope (every player only knows his own amount). You bid 90 Taler
and the other player bids 45 Taler (every player only knows his own bid).
Part 2 - 1st round: Now, you receive once again an envelope that contains 50 Taler
and the other player again receives an envelope that contains 10 Taler (every player
only knows his own amount). You do not receive further information about the
other player’s bid on your screen. Now, you can submit any bid between 0 and 120
Taler once again. The other player bids 45 Taler as in part 1.
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D Control questions (Section 2 - winner’s curse)
The following control questions were asked before the subjects started with the
actual bidding task. The subjects were only allowed to continue with the experiment
after all control questions were answered correctly.
1. You have 50 Taler in your envelope and the other player has 10 Taler in his
envelope. You bid 110 Taler and the other player bids 30 Taler. What would
be your payoff? (Correct answer: 30 Taler)
2. You have 50 Taler in your envelope and the other player has 10 Taler in his
envelope. You bid 50 Taler and the other player bids 30 Taler. What would
be your payoff? (Correct answer: 30 Taler)
3. You have 5 Taler in your envelope and the other player has 50 Taler in his
envelope. You bid 25 Taler and the other player bids 90 Taler. What would
be your payoff? (Correct answer: 0 Taler)
4. You have 5 Taler in your envelope and the other player has 50 Taler in his
envelope. You bid 100 Taler and the other player bids 90 Taler. What would
be your payoff? (Correct answer: −35 Taler)
5. You have 10 Taler in your envelope and the other player has 5 Taler in his
envelope. You bid 45 Taler and the other player bids 35 Taler. What would
be your payoff? (Correct answer: −20 Taler)
6. You have 10 Taler in your envelope and the other player has 5 Taler in his
envelope. You bid 60 Taler and the other player bids 35 Taler. What would
be your payoff? (Correct answer: −20 Taler)
7. You have 55 Taler in your envelope and the other player has 50 Taler in his
envelope. You bid 90 Taler and the other player bids 90 Taler. What would
be your payoff? (Correct answer: 15 Taler)
8. You have 55 Taler in your envelope and the other player has 50 Taler in his
envelope. You bid 80 Taler and the other player bids 90 Taler. What would
be your payoff? (Correct answer: 0 Taler)
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E Proofs (Section 3 - correlation neglect)
Proof of Proposition 7. For a given state G, the following combinations of correct
and false signals can possibly occur within a group of five members. This is illus-
trated by Table E.1.
Signals Probability Cumulative probability
5 correct; 0 false 2
3
5
≈ 0.131 ∼ 0.131
4 correct; 1 false 5 · (2
3
4
· 1
3
) ≈ 0.329 ∼ 0.461
3 correct; 2 false 10 · (2
3
3
· 1
3
2
) ≈ 0.329 ∼ 0.790
2 correct; 3 false 10 · (2
3
2
· 1
3
3
) ≈ 0.165 ∼ 0.955
1 correct; 4 false 5 · (2
3
· 1
3
4
) ≈ 0.041 ∼ 0.996
0 correct; 5 false 1
3
5
≈ 0.004 1.000
Table E.1: Combinations of signals
Given that all five members vote according to the signal they receive, the group will
match the state of the world in all cases where they receive at least 3 correct signals.
Hence, this will happen with a probability of around 79%.
Proof of Proposition 8. (i) We first look at the case where all other group members
vote according to their signal. Then the probability for being pivotal is given by
P (piv) =
(
4
2
)
· (2
3
· 2
3
· 1
3
· 1
3
) = 32
81
≈ 0.395.
Without loss of generality, we look at the probability for state r, conditional on the
voter being pivotal.
We have
P (r|piv) =
P (piv|r) · P (r)
P (piv)
.
Given that all other group members vote according to the signal they receive, the
probability of being pivotal is not affected by one state or the other and we have
P (piv|r) = P (piv|s) = P (piv) =
32
81
.
This leads to
P (r|piv) =
32
81
· 1
2
32
81
=
1
2
.
The proof works analogous for G = s.
(ii) Next we look at the case where all other group members vote according to their
preference pW . We denote the probability for having preference pR as q and the
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probability for having preference pS as (1− q) with q ∈ [0, 1]. Then the probability
for being pivotal is given by P (piv) =
(
4
2
)
·(q ·q ·(1−q)·(1−q)) = 8·(q2−2q3+q4) = z.
For z it holds that z ∈ [0, 1
2
].
Without loss of generality, we look at the probability for state r, conditional on the
voter being pivotal.
We have
P (r|piv) =
P (piv|r) · P (r)
P (piv)
.
Since state G and preference pW are independent of one another, the probability for
being pivotal is not affected by one state or the other and we have
P (piv|r) = P (piv|s) = P (piv) = z.
This leads to
P (r|piv) =
z · 1
2
z
=
1
2
.
The proof works analogous for G = s.
Proof (Treatment TwoInd). When receiving two independent signals, σ1G and σ
2
G,
which provide the same information, we have P (r|σ1r , σ
2
r) = P (s|σ
1
s , σ
2
s) = 0.8.
Without loss of generality, we look at the case where a subjects receives (σ1r , σ
2
r).
Then we have
P (r|σ1r , σ
2
r) =
P (σ1r , σ
2
r |r) · P (r)
P (σ1r , σ
2
r)
.
Since both signals are independent and both states of the world are equally likely,
we have
P (σ1r , σ
2
r |r) =
2
3
·
2
3
=
4
9
,
P (σ1r , σ
2
r |s) =
1
3
·
1
3
=
1
9
,
and
P (r) =
1
2
.
This yields
P (σ1r , σ
2
r) =
1
2
·
4
9
+
1
2
·
1
9
=
5
18
.
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Plugging this in leads to
P (r|σ1r , σ
2
r) =
4
9
· 1
2
5
18
=
4
5
= 0.8.
The proof works analogous for G = s.
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F Instructions (Section 3 - correlation neglect)
Welcome to this online experiment!
It will take approximately 10 minutes. In addition to your completion fee, you
can earn money depending on your decisions in this experiment. All pos-
sible earnings reported on the following pages are additional to your completion
fee of 1.00 Pound.
Please read the following consent form before continuing:
I consent to participate in this research study. I am free to withdraw at any time
without giving a reason (knowing that any payments only become effective if I
complete the study).
I understand that all data will be kept confidential by the researchers. All choices
are made in private and anonymously. Individual names and other personally iden-
tifiable information are not available to the researchers and will not be asked at any
time. No personally identifiable information will be stored with or linked to data
from the study.
I consent to the publication of study results as long as the information is anonymous
so that no identification of participants can be made.
By clicking the ‘Next’ button you declare that you have read and understand the
explanations and you voluntarily consent to participate in this study.
This experiment will consist of two parts.
IMPORTANT: Only one of the parts will be payoff-relevant for you!
Hence, your overall payoff in this study will be either:
(1) Overall payoff = completion fee + payoff in part 1
or
(2) Overall payoff = completion fee + payoff in part 2
Both options, (1) and (2), are equally likely.
We will inform you about your payoff-relevant part at the end of the experiment.
Your overall payoff will be calculated when all participants have completed this ex-
periment.
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Part 1
Basic setup:
You are part of a group consisting of 5 members in total. The remaining 4 members
are also participants in this experiment. The whole setup is completely anonymous.
This means you neither know the other participants or their decisions, nor do they
know you or your decisions.
The task of your group is to decide on one of two options, PURPLE or YEL-
LOW, by amajority vote (i.e., if at least 3 members of the group vote for the same
option, this option will be implemented). The implemented option will determine
your payoff.
You will be paid according to the implemented option in the following way:
a) If the group implements option PURPLE, every group member earns a payoff
that is with 90% chance 0.25 Pounds and with 10% chance 7.75 Pounds
(for each member of the group this will be drawn individually).
b) If the group implements option YELLOW, every group member earns a payoff
of 1.00 Pound for sure.
Part 2
Basic setup:
As before, the task of your group is to decide on one of two options, PURPLE
or YELLOW, by a majority vote. The implemented option will determine your
payoff.
In addition, your group also has a secret color (purple or yellow, and each color
is equally likely).
The secret color of your group has an additional effect on your payoff.
In advance, you do not know whether your group is purple or yellow.
Your payoff in part 2 will consist of two components:
Component 1: The implemented option affects the payoff itself (this is the same
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as in part 1).
Component 2: If your group implements the color of your group (e.g., group
is purple and the group votes PURPLE), every group member receives a bonus of
0.25 Pounds (+0.25). If your group implements the other color (e.g., group
is yellow and the the group votes PURPLE), every group member pays a penalty
of 0.25 Pounds (−0.25).
Observers:
In order to make an informed decision, there are three OBSERVERS who know
the secret color of your group.
OBSERVER 1 (tells always the truth): This OBSERVER will tell you the correct
color of your group.
OBSERVER 2 (tells always the truth): This OBSERVER will tell you the correct
color of your group.
OBSERVER 3 (lies always): This OBSERVER will tell you the wrong color of
your group.
You will receive a message by a randomly drawn OBSERVER in the form of a
short Note.
Hence, your Note will be correct in two out of three times.
Each member of the group receives an individual and randomly drawn Note from
one of the three OBSERVERS. Each of the three OBSERVERS is equally
likely for each group member.
Add-on in treatment TwoCorr
Furthermore, you also receive an additional message. The additional message is
from the same OBSERVER who gave you the first Note.
Add-on in treatment TwoInd
Furthermore, you also receive an additional message. The additional message is
randomly drawn from any OBSERVER (including the one who gave you
the first Note – all with equal likelihood).
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G Voting screens (Section 3 - correlation neglect)
Figure G.1: Typical voting screen in treatment OneSignal
Figure G.2: Typical voting screen in treatment TwoCorr
Figure G.3: Typical voting screen in treatment TwoInd
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H Balancing table (Section 4 - leadership)
Type Treatment
NOLEAD LEAD
Selfish 14 8
CC 26 31
Altruist 4 8
Mismatcher 0 1
Total 44 48
Pearson χ2(3) = 4.2424; p = 0.236
Table H.1: Number of different cooperation types across treatments
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I Translated instructions (Section 4 - leadership)
Welcome to this economic experiment! During the experiment you have the possi-
bility to conduct a task that is explained in detail in the following instructions. In
the experiment you can win a non-negligible amount of money. The amount of your
payoff depends on your decisions and on the other participants’ decisions. During
the experiment it is forbidden to communicate with the other participants. Please
read through the instructions at hand thoroughly. Should you have questions before
or during the experiment, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to
your seat.
General structure
The experiment consists of two parts, part 1 and part 2. These two parts are in-
dependent from each other - i.e., your decisions in part 1 have no influence on the
outcome of part 2 and vice versa. First, you will get instructions for part 1. Once
this part is completed, you will get instructions for part 2. In both, part 1 and part
2, you can earn money. Your final payoff consists of the sum of your payoffs from
part 1 and part 2. In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 4 EUR at the end
of the experiment. In any case, you will receive your show-up fee, regardless of your
decisions in the experiment. Your final payoff will therefore be made up as follows:
Total payoff = 4 EUR + payoff in part 1 + payoff in part 2.
Therefore, your total payoff will be at least 4 EUR.
Part 1
In part 1 you will be grouped with a randomly selected experimental participant
from this room, who is your peer for this part. One of you randomly gets the role
“Player 1”, while the other one gets the role “Player 2”. Each of you will now
receive 1 EUR from the experimenter. You can now decide whether you want to
KEEP this Euro or SEND it to your peer. When the Euro is sent, it doubles for
your peer. Your peer is facing same decision as you. This decision situation takes
place sequentially - i.e., the players make their decisions one after the other. This
is also shown in the graph below. First, Player 1 (BLUE) makes a decision. Player
2 (RED) can observe this decision and then makes a decision as well. In the exper-
iment you make a decision for both, the case that you are Player 1 and for the case
that you are Player 2. For this purpose, please follow the instructions on the screen.
At the end of the experiment a random generator will decide whether you or your
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peer will be given the role of “Player 1”. The other player automatically gets the
role of “Player 2”. By combining your decisions, your payoff will finally be formed,
as shown in the graphic below. Here, the payoff for player 1 is shown in BLUE and
the payoff for player 2 is shown in RED.
[GRAPH]
Example
Player 1 chooses SEND.
Player 2 chooses SEND if Player 1 chooses SEND and KEEP if Player 1 chooses
KEEP.
In this scenario, both players receive 2 EUR each.
Example
Player 1 chooses KEEP.
Player 2 chooses SEND if Player 1 chooses SEND and SEND if Player 1 chooses
KEEP.
In this scenario, player 1 receives 3 EUR and player 2 receives 0 EUR.
Part 2
Part 2 consists of 4 periods and each period consists of 7 rounds. This is illus-
trated in the following table.
Period 1 2 3 4
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In part 2 you can earn Taler. The conversion is as follows:
10 Taler = 1 Euro
At the end of the experiment you will receive your endowment of Taler paid out in
EUR. A random period is selected for your payment in part 2. This means that
only one of the four periods is relevant for your payoff. However, you do
not know beforehand which of the periods is relevant, but you get this information
only at the end of the experiment. At the beginning of each period, groups of 4
participants are formed. These groups are fixed for the complete period - i.e., they
will not be mixed within a period. Each group member is called either A, B, C, or
D. For each new period you are randomly assigned to a new group. This also
means that your label (A, B, C, or D) can change.
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The task
At the beginning of each period you are endowed with 20 Taler. In each round,
you can invest all or a part of your endowment into a group project (individual
contribution). The part of your endowment that you do NOT to invest, goes into
your private pot, which you keep for yourself. The investments of all 4 group
members go into a group pot. The amount within the group pot will then be
increased by 50% and equally split among all group members, regardless of how
much each individual has contributed. The new endowment of a participant at the
end of a round is then calculated as follows:
new endowment = old endowment – individual contribution +
1.5*(group pot/4) = private pot + 1.5*(group pot/4)
After each round you will be informed about your new endowment. Additionally,
you can also see how much the other members in your group have contributed
and their current endowment (see Screenshot 1). All amounts are always rounded to
the next integer. For the subsequent rounds, each player can choose any individual
contribution to the group pot which can be at most as high as the current equipment
of Taler of this player. In contrast to round 1, the equipment of Taler within the
rounds 2 - 7 can be smaller or larger than 20.
[SCREENSHOT 1]
**** ONLY in treatment NOLEAD ****
The players
In each round all group members (A, B, C and D) choose their individual contri-
butions simultaneously. (A typical decision screen is shown in Screenshot 2). This
means that all group members only learn at the end of a round which group member
contributed how much to the group pot.
Your current endowment is displayed at the top of the screen. This is
the maximal amount you can choose.
[SCREENSHOT 2]
**** ONLY in treatment LEAD ****
The starting player
At the beginning of each period, a starting player is randomly determined. This
player remains the starting player for the entire period - i.e., for the entire 7 rounds.
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All group members will be informed about who the starting player is (A, B, C, or
D). Each round now consists of the following two sections:
1. The selected starting player can now first decide on his individual contribution
(see Screenshot 2). If you are NOT the starting player, simply click “OK”
to continue while the starting player chooses his individual contribution (see
Screenshot 3).
2. The other players will be informed about the contribution of the starting player
and can then choose their own individual contributions (see Screenshot 4).
Your current endowment is displayed at the top of the screen. This is
the maximal amount you can choose.
[SCREENSHOT 2]
[SCREENSHOT 3]
[SCREENSHOT 4]
**** For BOTH treatments ****
Procedure during the experiment
(i) At the beginning you will be asked to answer a number of control questions.
You cannot earn money by answering these questions. The purpose of these ques-
tions is to make sure that you understand the game and the rules correctly.
(ii) You will then be given the opportunity to test on a example calculator what
endowment you would have if you and the other members in your group would select
a specific contribution (a maximum of 20 Taler, as in round 1). You can choose your
contribution with a slider next to the button “Your contribution”, and the contri-
butions of the other group members by using the sliders below. With this example
calculator, you can test different combinations. The purpose of the example calcu-
lator is to make yourself familiar with the basic principle of the task. Your entries
here have no influence on the further course of the experiment. Please note that
you can use this example calculator for a maximum of 180 seconds (= 3 minutes).
Then the experiment will automatically continue (you cannot actively continue by
clicking).
(iii) After the testing phase with the example calculator, the actual task begins and
you start with the first period as described above. Each period is exactly the same,
but in each period new groups are formed randomly.
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J Instructions (Section 5 - cooperation types)
Basics
This online experiment will consist of two parts.
First, part 1 will be explained. After part 1 ends, you will receive instructions for
part 2. Your decisions in part 1 do not influence your payoff in part 2 and vice versa.
In this study you will earn POINTS. Each POINT is worth 0.05 Dollar (20
POINTS = 1 DOLLAR). At the end of the study you receive your amount of
POINTS cashed out in Dollar.
In this study, you must answer control questions to ensure that you have under-
stood the task correctly (there are five control questions in total). Only if you
answer them correctly you can complete this survey. The control questions re-
quire some small calculations. If you give a wrong answer to a control question,
you can try multiple times until you find the correct solution.
Treatment SPD
You will be matched with one other random MTurker who also participates in this
study. One of you has the role of “Player 1” and the other one has the role of “Player
2”. Each of you is endowed with 10 POINTS. You have to decide whether you
want to KEEP your 10 POINTS or whether you want to SEND your 10 POINTS.
If the POINTS are sent, they double for the other player. The other MTurker has
to make the same decision.
This game is played sequentially – i.e., the players make their decisions subsequently
(this is illustrated by the graph below).
First Player 1 (BLUE) makes a decision. Player 2 (RED) observes this decision and
makes a decision as well. In this study, you make a decision for both roles, Player
1 and Player 2 (follow for this purpose simply the instructions on the screens). At
the end of the study, a random device determines the role of you and the other
MTurker. There are two possibilities: you are Player 1 and the other MTurker is
Player 2 or you are Player 2 and the other MTurker is Player 1. The combination
of the decisions of you and the other MTurker determines your payoff in this game,
as shown in the graph below.
Conversion rate: 20 POINTS = 1 DOLLAR.
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Before starting with the actual decisions, you are asked to answer two short control
questions to make sure that you have understood all rules of the game correctly.
Treatment FGF
You will now be in a group of 4 MTurkers. Each MTurker must decide on the di-
vision of 20 POINTS. You can put these 20 POINTS in a private account or you
can invest them fully or partially into a project. Any POINT that you do NOT
invest into the project, will automatically be transferred to your private account.
Your income from the private account:
For each POINT you put in your private account you will earn exactly one POINT.
Nobody except you earns something from your private account.
Your income from the project:
The amount of POINTS contributed to the project by ALL group members, will
be increased by 60% and then equally split among all group members. This means,
each group member will receive the same income from the project. Consequently,
for each POINT invested in the project each group member (including yourself)
receives 1.6/4 = 0.4 POINTS.
Hence, for each group member the income from the project will be determined as
follows:
Income from the project = sum of contributions to the project x 0.4.
For example, if the sum of all contributions to the project is 70 POINTS, then you
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and all group members will get a payoff of 70 x 0.4 = 28 POINTS each from the
project. If the sum of contributions is 15 POINTS, then you and all group members
will get a payoff of 15 x 0.4 = 6 POINTS each from the project.
Your total income:
Your total income is the sum of your income from the private account and the
project:
Income from the private account (= 20 - contribution to the project)
+
Income from the project (= 0.4 x Sum of contributions of all four players to
the project)
= TOTAL INCOME.
Conversion rate: 20 POINTS = 1 DOLLAR.
Your decisions:
In this part of the study, each participant has to make two types of decisions. In the
following we call them “unconditional contribution” and “conditional table”:
With the “unconditional contribution” to the project you have to decide how
many of your 20 POINTS you want to invest into the project. You do not know
how much the other players will invest.
Your second task is to fill a “contribution table”. For each possible average con-
tribution of the other group members (rounded to the nearest integer), you must
specify how many POINTS you want to contribute to the project. Thus, you can
condition your contribution on the contribution of the other group members.
In each group a random mechanism will select one group member. For the
randomly selected group member only the contribution table will be the payoff-
relevant decision. For the other three group members only the unconditional
contribution will be the payoff-relevant decision. When you make your uncondi-
tional contribution and when you fill out the contribution table, you do not
know whether you will be selected by the random mechanism. Hence, you have to
think carefully about both types of decisions because both can be relevant to you.
The combination of the decisions of you and the other group members determines
your payoff in this game.
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